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Past research on aid and growth is flawed because it typically examines the impact of aggregate 
aid on growth over a short period, usually four years, while significant portions of aid are unlikely 
to affect growth in such a brief time. We divide aid into three categories: (1) emergency and 
humanitarian aid (likely to be negatively correlated with growth); (2) aid that affects growth only 
over a long period of time, if at all, such as aid to support democracy, the environment, health, or 
education (likely to have no relationship to growth over four years); and (3) aid that plausibly 
could stimulate growth in four years, including budget and balance of payments support, 
investments in infrastructure, and aid for productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. Our 
focus is on the third group, which accounts for about 53% of all aid flows. We find a positive, 
causal relationship between this “short-impact” aid and economic growth (with diminishing 
returns) over a four-year period. The impact is large: at least two-to-three times larger than in 
studies using aggregate aid. Even at a conservatively high discount rate, at the mean a $1 
increase in short-impact aid raises output (and income) by $1.64 in present value in the typical 
country. From a different perspective, we find that higher-than-average short-impact aid to sub-
Saharan Africa raised per capita growth rates there by about half a percentage point over the 
growth that would have been achieved by average aid flows. The results are highly statistically 
significant and stand up to a demanding array of tests, including various specifications, 
endogeneity structures, and treatment of influential observations. The basic result does not 
depend crucially on a recipient’s level of income or quality of institutions and policies; we find that 
short-impact aid causes growth, on average, regardless of these characteristics. However, we 
find some evidence that the impact on growth is somewhat larger in countries with stronger 
institutions or longer life expectancies (better health). We also find a significant negative 
relationship between debt repayments and growth. We make no statement on, and do not 
attempt to measure, any additional effect on growth from other categories of aid (e.g., emergency 
assistance or aid that might affect growth over a longer time period); four-year panel regressions 
are not an appropriate tool to examine those relationships. 
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Past research on aid and growth is ￿ awed because it typically examines the impact of ag-
gregate aid on growth over a short period, usually four years, while signi￿cant portions of aid
are unlikely to a⁄ect growth in such a brief time. We divide aid into three categories: (1)
emergency and humanitarian aid (likely to be negatively correlated with growth); (2) aid that
a⁄ects growth only over a long period of time, if at all, such as aid to support democracy, the
environment, health, or education (likely to have no relationship to growth over four years); and
(3) aid that plausibly could stimulate growth in four years, including budget and balance of pay-
ments support, investments in infrastructure, and aid for productive sectors such as agriculture
and industry. Our focus is on the third group, which accounts for about 53% of all aid ￿ ows.
We ￿nd a positive, causal relationship between this ￿short-impact￿ aid and economic growth
(with diminishing returns) over a four-year period. The impact is large: at least two-to-three
times larger than in studies using aggregate aid. Even at a conservatively high discount rate,
at the mean a $1 increase in short-impact aid raises output (and income) by $1.64 in present
value in the typical country. From a di⁄erent perspective, we ￿nd that higher-than-average
short-impact aid to sub-Saharan Africa raised per capita growth rates there by about half a
percentage point over the growth that would have been achieved by average aid ￿ ows. The
results are highly statistically signi￿cant and stand up to a demanding array of tests, including
various speci￿cations, endogeneity structures, and treatment of in￿ uential observations. The
basic result does not depend crucially on a recipient￿ s level of income or quality of institutions
and policies; we ￿nd that short-impact aid causes growth, on average, regardless of these char-
acteristics. However, we ￿nd some evidence that the impact on growth is somewhat larger in
countries with stronger institutions or longer life expectancies (better health). We also ￿nd a
signi￿cant negative relationship between debt repayments and growth. We make no statement
on, and do not attempt to measure, any additional e⁄ect on growth from other categories of aid
(e.g., emergency assistance or aid that might a⁄ect growth over a longer time period); four-year
panel regressions are not an appropriate tool to examine those relationships.
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11 Introduction
What is the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth in low-income countries? Re-
searchers and policymakers have debated this question for years, with little resolution. Some re-
searchers have concluded that aid does little for growth, with a few suggesting that in the wrong
circumstances (such as under a corrupt dictator), aid can undermine growth and development. Oth-
ers have found that once they carefully control for collateral determinants of growth and allow for
diminishing returns, aid supports growth. They conclude that although the growth performance
of many countries has been disappointing over the last two decades￿ especially in sub-Saharan
Africa￿ in the absence of aid the growth performance would have been much worse.
Still other investigators accept the ￿nding of little or no aggregate relationship between aid
and growth across all countries, but ￿nd a positive relationship in certain subsets of countries,
particularly countries with strong policies and institutions. This last line of research has been
enormously in￿ uential in policy circles, with donor agencies beginning to embrace one implication￿
that more aid should go to countries with stronger policies and institutions￿ but more reluctant
to embrace another: that they should eliminate aid to countries with poor policies and institutions
where this strand of the research ￿nds no aid-growth relationship.
It is not surprising that this research has mixed ￿ndings, at least given how it has been conducted
to date, for two reasons. First, economic growth is not the sole objective of foreign aid, and in some
cases it is not the objective at all. For example, much of the aid that is given following natural
disasters is aimed at supporting immediate consumption and humanitarian needs, not building
productive capacity. Similarly, aid provided to build political systems or support democracies has
growth as only a secondary and distant objective. And of course much aid is given primarily for
political purposes (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000). Aid from the United States to Israel and Egypt,
for example, was designed to support the Camp David peace accords, and current US aid to Pakistan
is designed to bolster that country￿ s e⁄orts in ￿ghting the war on terrorism. Similarly, signi￿cant
amounts of French aid went to its former colonies as a way to ensure continued French in￿ uence in
those countries. With politically based aid, growth is but a welcome side e⁄ect and is not the metric
by which policymakers evaluate the e⁄ectiveness of aid. Given the variety of ex-ante objectives for
aid, it is to be expected that ex-post evaluations of aid e¢ cacy ￿nd mixed results when conducted
as if growth were the only objective.
Second, the approach used in most studies is not well suited to detect the growth e⁄ects of large
portions of aid. Almost all the macro-level research on this issue over the past decade has usedcross-country growth regressions based on panel data with four-year observations. While growth
regressions in general have many weaknesses, one of these is of particular importance in this case.
In our view, it is uninformative to test the hypothesis that all foreign aid has a positive impact on
economic growth over a four year period. Consider, for example, aid for disasters and emergencies￿
henceforth, ￿humanitarian￿aid. This kind of assistance should have a negative simple correlation
with growth, as the disaster simultaneously causes both low growth and large aid in￿ ows. While
it is possible that aid might mitigate that fall in growth, any additional pathway of causation
from humanitarian aid to growth is extremely di¢ cult to detect. Either one must instrument well
for these emergency aid ￿ ows￿ which are inherently unpredictable￿ or somehow treat observations
involving emergencies separately from others. Most researchers attempt neither. Including this kind
of aid in standard regressions clearly biases downward (if not reversing the sign of) any aid-growth
relationship.
Similarly, it makes little sense to believe that several broad classes of aid can have a positive e⁄ect
on growth over a four-year period. No one should expect that aid provided to halt environmental
degradation or to build democracies would a⁄ect growth in four years. Even aid for education and
health programs, which may have a strong impact on long-run growth, should not be expected
to in￿ uence growth in four years. Strengthening primary education systems and reducing infant
mortality might support growth in twenty years, but not four. In a cross-country growth regression
with observations of just four years, these aid ￿ ows aimed at longer-term growth should be expected
to have zero (or perhaps a tiny positive) correlation with growth.
Simply extending the observation period does not solve this problem. Longer periods allow more
time for the e⁄ects of aid to be realized, but they also include much more uncontrolled noise. The
variance in growth to be explained rises dramatically with respect to the variance in aid. Regressions
of growth on aggregate aid face an inescapable tradeo⁄ between comprehensiveness and attribution.
Although the four year period is arbitrary, we use it since it has been used extensively in the aid-
growth literature (and the cross-country growth literature more broadly), and we believe that by
dissagregating aid we can show it has an impact on growth over this period in ways that the previous
literature has simply missed.
This is not to suggest that researchers should expect to ￿nd no relationship at all between aid
and growth. By contrast, we should expect a certain subset of aid ￿ ows to in￿ uence growth over
four years. Aid to build infrastructure￿ roads, irrigation systems, electricity generators and ports￿
should a⁄ect growth rates fairly quickly. So should aid to support directly productive sectors, such
as agriculture, industry, trade, and services. Aid that comes as cash, such as budget or balance of
2payments support, also should be expected to positively a⁄ect growth fairly immediately if it is to
do so at all. For these kinds of aid ￿ ows, it is perfectly reasonable for policymakers to expect and
for researchers to test for a positive causal relationship with growth over a four-year period.
However, almost all research on aid and growth lump these three kinds of aid ￿ ows together￿
humanitarian aid with a negative association with growth, long-term investments with zero or very
little short-term positive relationship, and infrastructure and balance of payments support with a
plausibly positive relationship. In addition, most researchers generally subtract debt repayments and
examine ￿net￿aid, even though debt repayments are wholly separate ￿nancial transactions from aid
in￿ ows with possibly a quite di⁄erent relationship with economic growth. It is little wonder that
research that fails to distinguish between these e⁄ects gives diverse results that are di¢ cult to
interpret. It would be astonishing if these mixed inputs gave any clear results at all.
This paper aims to remedy this weakness in the research on foreign aid and economic growth.
Instead of focusing primarily on the heterogeneity of aid recipients, our starting point is to explore
the heterogeneity of aid ￿ ows and their impact on growth. In short, we disaggregate aid ￿ ows into the
three types outlined above￿ aid for humanitarian purposes, aid that would only a⁄ect growth over
a long period of time, and aid that might impact growth over a four year period. We also examine
aid in￿ ows separately from debt repayments. Our particular focus is the sub-category of aid that
might reasonably a⁄ect growth over a four-year period, which by our classi￿cation constitutes about
53% of all aid ￿ ows.
We ￿nd a strong, positive, and causal relationship between ￿short-impact￿ aid, as we call it,
and economic growth (with diminishing returns) over a four-year period. The impact is large, with
the estimated relationship conservatively two-to-three times larger than that found in studies using
aggregate foreign aid. The results are highly statistically signi￿cant and robust over a wide variety of
speci￿cations, time periods, and estimation techniques. The basic result does not depend on levels of
income, the strength of institutions, or the quality of policies; we ￿nd that short-impact aid causes
growth, on average, across countries regardless of these characteristics. That being said, we ￿nd
some evidence that the impact on growth is even larger in the presence of strong institutions and in
countries with longer life expectancies (better general health conditions). The key point, however,
is that we detect a powerful relationship between short-impact aid and growth across all countries
on average, not just those with strong institutions or policies, and ￿nd a slightly larger relationship
in the presence of good institutions. This di⁄ers substantially from some previous research, such as
Burnside and Dollar (2000), which by using aggregate aid was able to detect a positive aid-growth
relationship only in the presence of strong policies and institutions.
3With respect to the other sub-categories of aid, as expected we ￿nd little or no relationship
between either humanitarian aid or long-term aid and economic growth over a four year period. But
we emphasize that we do not and cannot conclude that these aid ￿ ows have no impact on growth.
Rather, we conclude that standard growth regression analysis based on four year panel data is an
inappropriate tool to examine the e⁄ect of those types of aid. A di⁄erent approach is needed to
explore these relationships, which we leave for future research.
This paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews three decades of literature on aid and
growth, distinguishing studies that have found no impact of aid on growth, those that have found
a positive relationship, and those that have found a conditional positive relationship in certain
sub-groups of recipient countries. Section three outlines our method for disaggregating aid into
disbursements for ￿short-impact￿ aid, ￿long-impact￿ aid, and humanitarian relief. Section four
provides our core results. Section ￿ve provides a wide range of robustness checks on our core
results. Section six carefully interprets the implications of our estimated coe¢ cients and examines the
heterogeneity of the relationship across countries. Section seven methodically dissects the di⁄erences
between our results and two earlier well-known studies on aid and growth. Section eight outlines
some broad policy implications. The ￿nal section reviews the main quantitative ￿ndings and suggests
future directions.
2 Un￿nished business in 30 years of research
2.1 Early evidence on the growth e⁄ect of aid
Studies of aid-growth linkages over the past four decades can be conveniently divided into several
phases.1 The earliest attempts are built on growth models like that of Domar (1947) and Rostow
(1956) which assume that in￿ ows of foreign assistance represent an exogenous, one-for-one increment
to domestic capital. On this premise, a given desired rate of growth in the absence of other capital
￿ ows directly implies an aid requirement. These studies do not attempt to measure the aid-growth
relationship directly. Pioneering studies in this vein include the work of two onetime World Bank
chief economists, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) and Hollis Chenery (Chenery and Strout 1966).
Their models were the basis for Marris￿ s (1970) calculation of a $23-$28 billion ￿need for development
assistance,￿roughly 1% of developed countries￿GDP at the time.
Phase one begins with Gri¢ n￿ s (1970, p. 108) opening salvo against the earlier research: the
1Mosley (1980) and Hansen and Tarp (2000) have previously divided the aid-growth literature into phases. Our
attempt more closely resembles that of Mosley￿ extended to the present. There is also a rich empirical literature on
linkages from aid to other outcomes such as savings and investment, which we omit for focus.
4assertion that ￿what evidence I have seen suggests that ... it is quite possible that the slight positive
e⁄ect of foreign capital in raising investment will be more than o⁄set by a decline in the output-
capital ratio, so that the growth rate actually falls.￿Gri¢ n and Enos (1970) report zero or negative
correlation between aid receipts and growth in 27 countries, sparking spirited response and counter-
response articles in the top development economics journal of the day. The OLS regressions of
Weisskopf (1972) demonstrate a signi￿cant negative correlation between foreign capital in￿ ows and
savings in 14 of 17 developing countries studied, in support of Gri¢ n￿ s argument. But the literature
up to that point still lacks a broad test of the aid-growth relationship.
Papanek (1972) launches phase two with an attack on what he calls the ￿revisionist￿literature
above. He points out that savings were chie￿ y calculated by subtracting foreign capital in￿ ows
from investment￿ resulting in a vacuous negative correlation between foreign capital and savings.
Papanek (1973) separates aid from other types of foreign capital and becomes the ￿rst to regress
growth on aid, in a model resembling
_ yi;t=yi;t = ￿ + ￿dnet
i;t + Xi;t￿ + "i;t (1)
where yi;t is income per capita in country i at time t, dnet
i;t is net disbursements of aggregate aid, Xi;t
is a vector of country characteristics, ￿ and ￿ are constants, ￿ is a vector of constants, "i;t is white
noise, and a superscript dot represents the derivative with respect to time. Note that he includes
no convergence term￿ a feature this literature only acquires in 1999 and thereafter. Papanek ￿nds
a strongly signi￿cant positive correlation between aid and growth in 51 countries during three ￿ve-
year periods over 1950-1965. This global result is not statistically signi￿cant when he restricts the
sample to the Americas, a ￿nding echoed by Gulati (1978) in a 1966-1969 cross-section of 12 Latin
American countries.
Phase three addresses at last the direction of causality, beginning when Mosley (1980) becomes
the ￿rst to instrument for aid. His model resembles
_ yi;t=yi;t = ￿ + ￿dnet
i;t + Xi;t￿ + "i;t (2)
dnet
i;t = Zi;t￿ + ￿i;t
where Zi;t is a vector of exogenous instruments, ￿ is a vector of constants, and ￿i;t is white noise.
He ￿nds a negative but insigni￿cant e⁄ect of aid on growth over the period 1970-77 in an 83-country
cross section. The 2SLS estimate of Dowling and Hiemenz (1982, p. 13) is qualitatively identical,
in a three-period panel covering 1968-1979. Dowling and Hiemenz posit that aid may be poorly
5instrumented in both studies, though neither paper provides any information on what instruments
were used or how well they captured variation in aid. There are suggestions in both studies that the
data deserve further exploration. For example, when Mosley restricts his sample to the 30 poorest
countries and lags aid by ￿ve years, or restricts the sample to recipients of bilateral aid from the
United Kingdom, the coe¢ cient on aid becomes positive and signi￿cant at the 5% level.
The remainder of phase three is a decade of controversy. Gupta and Islam (1983) and Levy (1988)
claim a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of aid on growth, and Singh (1985), Mosley et al. (1987) and
Boone (1994) ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect. Gupta and Islam study cross sections of ten-year growth
in 52 countries, ￿nding the e⁄ect of instrumented aid to be signi￿cantly positive at the 10% level
in the 1960s and at the 1% level in the 1970s. By restricting the sample to African countries and
extending the period of observation to 15 years of growth, Levy ￿nds a positive coe¢ cient on aid
signi￿cant at the 1% level in an OLS cross-section.
In a larger sample of countries, Mosley et al. ￿nd an e⁄ect of zero in the 1960s, 1970s and
1980-83 without instrumenting for aid, and report instrumented results only for the 1970s￿ where
aid again has no e⁄ect on growth. It is noteworthy, however, that the coe¢ cient on aid in the 1970s
switches from negative to positive upon instrumentation (though still insigni￿cant) and that the
OLS coe¢ cient on aid is positive during 1970-83 when the sample is restricted to Africa. Perhaps
most importantly, Mosley et al. use a di⁄erent de￿nition of ￿ aid￿than do the other studies: gross
O¢ cial Development Assistance (ODA), rather than net ODA, without controlling for repayments
on aid. In a footnote they ￿nd that the e⁄ect of net ODA is positive and signi￿cant at the 10%
level, but dismiss this as unworthy of further exploration. Singh controls for a subjective indicator
of ￿investment climate￿and also ￿nds no e⁄ect of aid in the 1960s and 1970s, though he does not
instrument for aid. Shan (1994), using observation periods of only one year, ￿nds a signi￿cant
negative correlation between aid and growth in an OLS framework.
Finally Boone, in a table of six often-cited but unpublished growth regressions,2 greatly extends
the sample to cover 1971 to 1990, in 117 countries. His simple OLS regression with ￿ve-year periods
and country ￿xed e⁄ects ￿nds a coe¢ cient of zero on aid. In ten-year growth periods without country
e⁄ects, he ￿nds a positive coe¢ cient signi￿cant at the 10% level. The standard error on the latter
estimate would reject the null hypothesis that the growth correlation of aid is negative or zero at the
5% level (one-tailed). Boone also ignores the potential endogeneity of aid to growth as well as the
fact that his result is sensitive to the period of observation. He nevertheless concludes that ￿[t]he lack
2Parts of Boone￿ s (1994) analysis were published in Boone (1996), but without his growth regressions.
6of robustness of the aid variable in the regression ... shows that aid does not create, nor correlate
with, those underlying factors which cause growth￿(p. 25). In the published version, Boone (1996)
retains the claim that ￿aid programs have not ... engendered or correlated with the basic ingredients
that cause ... growth.￿This causal hypothesis would be easy to test, by instrumenting for aid (in
the working paper growth regressions) or by using growth as a dependent variable (in the published
version), but Boone does neither.
2.2 The micro-macro paradox: Apologists and gainsayers
Boone￿ s is the paper that launched a thousand regressions. Many researchers have taken Boone￿ s
￿ndings as con￿rmation of a ￿macro-micro paradox￿ : that so many aid-funded projects report
positive micro-level economic returns somehow undetectable at the macro-level. Here begins phase
four, in which the literature splits into two strands￿ one trying to explain the paradox and the other
denying its existence.
2.2.1 The ￿ conditional￿strand
The ￿rst or ￿conditional￿strand takes Boone to be more or less correct: the average e⁄ect of aid
across all countries is indeed roughly zero, and only in some countries at some times it is positive.
For this group, the challenge is to identify the characteristics that separate those countries (or time
periods) in which aid has a positive impact on growth from those where it is negative or zero.
This strand has proposed a wide variety of variables as candidates for the country characteristic
upon which any positive e⁄ect of aid depends, including measures of economic governance, timing,
and location. These variables have included in￿ ation, budget balance, and ￿openness￿(Burnside
and Dollar 2000, Kudlyak 2002); export price shocks (Collier and Dehn 2001); climatic shocks and
trends and volatility in the terms of trade (Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001, Chauvet and Guillaumont
2002); policy and institutional quality (Collier and Dollar 2002); institutional quality alone (Burnside
and Dollar 2004); policy and warfare (Collier and Hoe› er 2002); ￿ totalitarian￿government (Islam
2003); an index of economic freedom (Ovaska 2003)3; and the degree to which aid is fungible across
sectors in the recipient country (Pettersson 2004). All of these studies, unlike Boone and all of his
predecessors, also modify the speci￿cation to include initial income per capita in some form. The
3Ovaska (2003) concludes, ￿Overall, the results of this study do not provide support for the notion that interna-
tional development aid￿ at least as in practice between 1975 and 1998￿ helps developing countries to higher growth
trajectories.￿This conclusion is odd, given that the study￿ s full-sample, unrestricted regression shows aid as having a
large, unconditional, signi￿cant, positive impact on growth, with diminishing returns (Table 2, column 4). The study
is moreover fundamentally ￿awed in that, unlike all other recent empirical aid-growth work, it strangely controls
for investment, education, and government spending on the right-hand side￿ presumably the very channels through
which aid could a⁄ect the economy!
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+ Xi;t￿ + ￿lnyi;t + "i;t (3)
dnet
i;t = Zi;t￿ + ￿i;t
where qi;t is some country characteristic on which the e⁄ect of aid depends, and ￿ and ￿ are constants.
Four of the aforementioned studies, when they do not allow for a heterogeneous aid e⁄ect (i.e.
constraining ￿ = 0), cannot detect any signi￿cant growth e⁄ect of aid (Burnside and Dollar 2000,
2004; Chauvet and Guillaumont 2002; Pettersson 2004). The rest focus on measuring ￿ and do not
report results on the signi￿cance of the aid term in the absence of an interaction e⁄ect.
Nevertheless, the underlying goal of this literature has been to ￿provide some insight into why
aid is not e⁄ective in the typical recipient country￿ (Burnside and Dollar 2000, p. 864). The
￿ conditional￿strand of the literature has been very in￿ uential in policy circles, in particular the
study by Burnside and Dollar (2000). This research has supported moves by the World Bank, other
multilateral development banks, and some donor governments to be more ￿selective￿with their aid
and allocate a larger share to countries with stronger policies and institutions where it presumably
can have a larger impact on growth.
While many of the interaction e⁄ects posited by the ￿ conditional￿strand are intuitively plausible,
Roodman (2003) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) have recently cast serious doubt on
the qualitative conclusions of a majority of these studies. They ￿nd that the signi￿cance of the
interaction coe¢ cient ￿ is frequently highly sensitive to in￿ uential observations and extensions of
the dataset. Roodman￿ s ongoing work ￿nds that estimates of ￿ in much of this literature are thus
fragile to updated data, in￿ uential observations, and corrections for autocorrelation.4
2.2.2 The ￿ unconditional￿strand
The second or ￿unconditional￿ strand of the phase four literature argues instead that Boone is
wrong. Though aid does not have the same e⁄ect everywhere, it does have on average a positive
growth impact￿ large and detectable across recipients without conditioning the e⁄ect on any other
4He ￿nds that the results of Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Daalgard et al. (2004) are relatively robust to expansion
of the dataset, correction for serially correlated errors, and other tests. The results of Collier and Dehn (2001),
Collier and Hoe› er (2002), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) are weakened by Roodman￿ s tests but do not entirely
disappear. The results of Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2002) are very fragile. Of the studies
whose results Roodman￿ s tests con￿rm, Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Dalgaard et al. (2004) report tests of the aid-
growth relationship without an interaction term, and ￿nd it to be positive and signi￿cant; we thus include them in
the ￿unconditional￿strand of the recent literature despite the fact that Dalgaard et al. focus on the interaction term
between aid and tropical area. In short, none of the recent studies that survive Roodman￿ s interrogation both 1) tests
an unconditional relationship between aid and growth and 2) fails to ￿nd such a relationship.
8country traits. This strand posits simply that Boone￿ s regression speci￿cation is wrong in one of
several ways, none of which depends upon heterogeneity of the aid e⁄ect.
The plurality of research in this strand argues that Boone￿ s assumption of a linear impact of aid
on growth is less realistic than a nonlinear relationship between the two, in which aid is subject to
diminishing returns and there is some limit to recipients￿capacity to absorb more aid productively.5
The ￿rst to allow for a nonlinear aid e⁄ect are Hadjimichael et al. (1995), who ￿nd a strongly positive
impact of aid with diminishing returns in a Generalized Least Squares cross section of 31 African
countries, 1986-1992. Durbarry et al. (1998) ￿nd the same result in an expanded sample of 58
LDCs across 1970-1993, again using GLS. Dalgaard and Hansen (2000) are the ￿rst among these to
instrument for aid. Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) also ￿nd a strong, unconditional, nonlinear impact
of instrumented aid on growth that does not depend on in￿ uential observations. They are the ￿rst
to employ a Generalized Method of Moments estimator in an aid-growth regression. They conclude
unequivocally, ￿The micro-macro paradox is non-existent￿ (Hansen and Tarp 2000, emphasis in
original). Lensink and White (2001) con￿rm the nonlinear impact in a greatly expanded sample of
111 countries, 1975-1992, with a 2SLS estimator. Dalgaard et al. (2004), although they emphasize
the signi￿cant interaction between aid and fraction of land in the tropics, ￿nd an unconditional
positive and nonlinear e⁄ect of aid in the absence of the interaction. In short, each of these estimates
a model similar to






+ Xi;t￿ + ￿lnyi;t + "i;t (4)
dnet
i;t = Zi;t￿ + ￿i;t
A number of other studies do not include a squared aid term, but belong in the ￿unconditional￿
strand because they ￿nd an impact of aid on growth not conditioned on interaction with any other
recipient-country trait. Each modi￿es the speci￿cation or estimator used by Boone in some way other
than adding a squared aid term. Lensink and Morrissey (1999) include an indicator of uncertainty in
aid ￿ ows constructed by comparing aid commitments and disbursements, and extend the observation
period to 25 years. They are also the ￿rst among aid-growth researchers to include a convergence
term in their regressions. Their OLS cross section of 75 countries ￿nds a strongly signi￿cant, positive,
linear relationship between aid and growth. Cungu and Swinnen (2003) focus on the interaction e⁄ect
between aid and their indicator of ￿ economic liberalization￿ , but ￿nd that one-year lagged aid has
5Heller and Gupta (2002) review the empirical evidence that very large aid ￿ows can induce Dutch Disease,
overwhelm management capacity, undermine alternative revenue collection, and provide greater opportunities for
corruption, among other impediments to growth. Hodler (2004) derives an ￿ inverted U￿aid-growth relationship from
an endogenous growth model with redistribution to rent-seeking agents.
9a positive, signi￿cant, linear e⁄ect on growth unconditional on any interaction. Dayton-Johnson
and Hoddinott (2003) uniquely add country ￿xed e⁄ects and ￿nd a strongly positive, linear impact
of instrumented aid on growth in countries outside Sub-Saharan Africa. Gomanee et al. (2003)
￿nd no evidence of diminishing returns but do ￿nd a nonlinear impact of aid unconditional on any
interactions￿ once countries are past a certain threshold of aid receipts. Moreira￿ s (2003) di⁄erenced
GMM results show a highly signi￿cant, positive, nonlinear impact of aid in 48 countries from 1970
to 1998. Economides et al. (2004) endogenize quality of governance as a determinant of growth,
and ￿nd a strongly signi￿cant, positive, linear impact of aid unconditional on interaction e⁄ects.
The ongoing research of Roodman (2003) tests the sensitivity of results from three papers in
the ￿ unconditional￿strand to expanded datasets and correction for serially correlated errors. He
￿nds the regressions of Dalgaard et al. (2004) to be quite robust to these changes. The qualitative
conclusions of Hansen and Tarp￿ s (2001) GMM results are also robust, though with a larger standard
error on the linear aid term.
2.3 A third path: All aid is not alike
As we describe in more detail later in the paper, in this study we propose a third reaction to Boone,
a road not traveled by these two strands of recent work, that focuses on matching aid ￿ ows to a
realistic time period over which they might in￿ uence growth.
A review of the earlier research reveals that in almost all studies, the coe¢ cient on instrumented
aid is signi￿cantly positive when it is allowed ten or more years to have its e⁄ect on growth (Mosley;
Gupta and Islam; Levy). Boone￿ s results (though he does not instrument for aid) also show that
when the periods of observation are extended to ten years across his full sample of countries, the
hypothesis that the e⁄ect of aid is zero or negative is rejected at the 5% level (one-tailed). Among the
pre-phase four studies that do instrument for aid there is only one exception to this pattern: Mosley
et al., whose results are￿ as discussed above￿ sensitive to their unique de￿nition of aid. Thus, the
time period over which the aid-growth relationship is evaluated seems to have a signi￿cant bearing
on the results.
Any evaluation of a policy intervention without a control group faces an inescapable tradeo⁄
between comprehensiveness and attribution. A long-run analysis captures long-run e⁄ects but cannot
con￿dently attribute those e⁄ects to the intervention because so many other changes can occur in
the interim. A short-run analysis can be more con￿dent of attribution but is less likely to have
10captured the full e⁄ect. We can, however, partly escape this conundrum to the degree that we can
identify elements of the intervention whose e⁄ects are more likely to be realized in the short run.
Suppose a donor uses a million dollars to build a road in a given country, and another million
to build several primary schools. Both the road and the schools are complete within one year. An
investigator now wishes to measure the growth impact of the donor￿ s entire investment of two million
dollars. When should she conduct her assessment? If she does it two years later, she is likely to be
able to measure a signi￿cant part of the impact of the road, which will already be carrying factors
and products to and fro as part of the public capital stock. She will miss almost entirely, however,
the impact of the schools on the productive capital stock￿ aside from the little that some of the
construction workers might have invested from their wages. Her estimate of the returns to the entire
$2 million portfolio is biased sharply downwards. On the other hand, if she conducts the study 20
years later, when the educated children have brought their human capital to the workforce, much
else will have happened in the country. Attribution of changes in growth to the road or to the schools
will be extremely di¢ cult, and the e⁄ect of the entire aid portfolio cannot be reliably distinguished
from zero. Neither of these studies can detect the full impact of the two projects jointly.
There are two options for evaluation in facing this tradeo⁄: varying the period of observation, or
disaggregating aid ￿ ows (in e⁄ect to measure the impact of the road and school separately). First,
a longer period may capture more of the long-term e⁄ect but can greatly increase noise and impede
attribution of growth events to causal aid events in the distant past. Two recent papers have taken
this approach. Easterly (2003) addresses the issue by analyzing the Burnside and Dollar dataset
with observation periods of 8, 12, and 24 years. The coe¢ cient on aid is insigni￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero throughout, in the presence of an aid-policy interaction term. He does not report 2SLS
tests without the (insigni￿cant) aid-policy interaction term, does not allow for a nonlinear e⁄ect of
aid, and adheres to Burnside and Dollar￿ s de￿nition of the aid variable as ￿E⁄ective Development
Assistance￿(EDA) divided by GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (as we discuss later in the paper,
this unusual de￿nition of the aid variable is open to question). Brumm (2003) uses a cross section of
23-year periods in his regressions otherwise mimicking those of Burnside and Dollar. Brumm does
not test for the growth e⁄ect of aid in the absence of the policy interaction term, does not allow for
a nonlinear impact of aid, and does not instrument for aid or any other variable. Despite his longer
observation period, then, Brumm￿ s brief note does not improve on the aid-growth literature of the
1970s for the purpose of inquiring whether or not aid causes growth; it certainly does not represent
grounds for his conclusion that ￿foreign aid negatively a⁄ects economic growth.￿
With respect to disaggregating aid ￿ ows, other very recent studies have in some way considered
11aid disaggregated by purpose, but none with the aim of analyzing the growth impact of aid within
an appropriate time horizon. Owens and Hoddinott (1999) ￿nd that household welfare in Zimbabwe
is increased by development aid (infrastructure, agricultural extension, etc.) far more than by
humanitarian aid (food aid, emergency transfers, etc.), even in humanitarian emergencies. Mavrotas
(2002) disaggregates aid to India into ￿program,￿￿project,￿and ￿technical assistance￿￿ ows, and
￿nds a negative correlation between growth and all three types of aid in India 1970-92. Mavrotas
(2003) uses a time-series error-correction model to test the growth impact of aid in Uganda. He
￿nds a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect of ￿program￿aid much larger than than of ￿project￿aid, but
signi￿cantly negative impacts of technical cooperation and food aid. The study of Gomanee et al.
(2002) on aid and growth in Africa excludes food aid and technical cooperation from the ODA
measure, especially since the latter would only a⁄ect growth ￿with a long time lag.￿Cordella and
dell￿ Ariccia (2003) ￿nd that the policy sensitivity of aid￿ s growth impact measured by Burnside and
Dollar di⁄ers for ￿program￿(non-sector allocable) and ￿project￿(sector-speci￿c) aid. Pettersson
(2004) disaggregates aid by sector in order to classify aid according to whether or not it is intended
for a sector in which aid has been found to be fungible, and ￿nds no di⁄erence between the growth
e⁄ects of ￿non-fungible￿sector aid and ￿fungible￿sectoral aid, at a given policy level.
To continue the road-and-school example from earlier, the investigator escapes the problem
almost entirely if she can observe how much of total aid was spent on the road. She simply sets out
to measure the impact of the road project￿ or any other aid ￿ ows that might a⁄ect growth over a
short period￿ on growth, and conducts her study after two years. Though she remains uninformed
about the impact of the school project (or other longer-term aid ￿ ows), she can at least con￿dently
claim to capture something resembling the full impact of the road project. This is, in essence, what
our study sets out to do: investigate the short-run impacts of that part of aid whose e⁄ects on
growth can reasonably be expected to a⁄ect growth in the short-run. We neither can nor endeavor
to make any statement about the long-run e⁄ects of aid whose expected e⁄ect comes in the long
run.
3 Isolating the ￿short-impact￿component of aid
We divide aggregate aid into three mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive categories:
￿ Short-impact aid is de￿ned as an aid disbursement funding an intervention that can plausibly
raise GDP per capita within roughly four years to a permanently higher level. We choose this
time window since nearly all recent aid-growth studies have employed cross-country panels of
four (or occasionally ￿ve) years.
12￿ Long-impact aid funds an intervention that might permanently raise GDP per capita but is
unlikely to do so within roughly four years of the disbursement.6
￿ Humanitarian aid is the small portion of total aid that is for very short-term consumption
smoothing and is not intended to directly promote long-term increases in income per capita￿
such as emergency food aid during natural disasters.
While most previous studies implicitly assume that all of these types of aid a⁄ect current growth
in exactly the same way and estimate the relationship between growth and ￿net￿ aid (gross aid
in￿ ows minus debt repayments), we instead estimate a model resembling
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i;t ￿ri;t. Lastly, Si;t is a vector of squared aid disbursements of the
various types, and ￿ is a vector of constants. In terms of (5), most of the recent aid-growth literature




r, as well as making a complex set of assumptions about ￿
such that all types of aid are nonlinear in the same way.7 We relax, and test, that supposition.
Earlier studies have assumed variously that growth did not enter Zi;t, that ￿ = 0, or that ￿ = 0. We
relax all of these assumptions.
In rough terms, ￿short-impact￿aid is 1) budget support or ￿program￿aid given for any pur-
pose, and 2) project aid given for real sector investments for infrastructure or to directly support
production in transportation (including roads), communications, energy, banking, agriculture and
industry. These are expenditures whose growth e⁄ects might be observed to some degree within a
horizon of roughly four years. ￿Long-impact￿aid is 1) technical cooperation given for any purpose,
and 2) most social sector investments, including in education, health, population control, and water.
￿Humanitarian￿aid includes emergency assistance and food aid.
Perhaps the most important reason why an analysis of this kind has not previously been at-
tempted is that disaggregated aid disbursements are not readily available. Remarkably, there is no
6We assume that all other characteristics of ￿short-impact￿and ￿long-impact￿aid aside from the growth impact of
that which they ￿nance are equal. In particular, we assume that the time elapsed between receipt of a disbursement
and its expenditure does not vary systematically between the two aid types by more than a ￿scal year.
7There are minor variations on this theme, such as Mosley et al. (1987) who assume ￿s = ￿l = ￿h and ￿r = 0,
and Gomanee et al. (2002) who roughly assume ￿s = ￿l = ￿￿r and ￿h = 0.
13centralized and standardized database that disaggregates foreign aid disbursements according to de-
tails of their purpose. Although the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has compiled disaggregated aid disbursements
covering much of the 1990s for many (but not all) of its donor members, it has not done so for earlier
years￿ with the exception of emergency humanitarian aid. Otherwise, the data for the 1970s and
1980s is reported as commitments rather than disbursements. Short-impact aid disbursements and
long-impact aid disbursements must therefore be estimated.
The OECD￿ s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) does report aid commitments disaggregated by
233 distinct purposes, for all donors and recipients annually since 1973.8 Examples of the OECD￿ s
detailed purpose categories include ￿plant and post-harvest protection and pest control￿(code 31192)
and ￿population policy and administrative management￿(code 13010). Each purpose is further split
into four categories (which the OECD calls ￿pre￿x code￿ ): ￿investment project,￿￿other resource
provision including commodities and supplies,￿￿technical cooperation,￿and ￿program aid/cash.￿
We estimate short-impact, long-impact, and humanitarian aid disbursements in three steps.
First, prior to any statistical analysis we assign all 233 OECD purpose codes to one of three cate-
gories: short-impact, long-impact, or humanitarian. We begin this process by assigning all aid ￿ ows
to ￿long-impact,￿and then reclassifying selected ￿ ows to ￿short-impact￿if we are con￿dent that a
large portion of their full impact on growth could be realized within less than eight years. Categories
that are moved over to ￿short-impact￿include real sector investments in transportation (including
roads), communications, energy, banking agriculture and industry. Commodity and general pro-
gram assistance is also moved to ￿short-impact.￿In each of these groups, monies spent on policy
formulation are kept in ￿long-impact.￿Items that remain in ￿long-impact￿are most social sector
investments, including in education, health, population control, and water. Emergency assistance
and food aid are placed in ￿humanitarian.￿This results in a three-way division of aggregate aid we
term ￿De￿nition 1.￿
We further re￿ne this classi￿cation by making use of the four ￿pre￿x codes.￿All aid for technical
cooperation, regardless of its purpose, is classi￿ed as ￿long-impact.￿ This re￿ ects our belief that
technical cooperation, to the extent that it can a⁄ect growth, does so as an input to a complex process
of long-term institutional change (e.g. Browne 2002). All ￿program aid/cash￿￿ ows, regardless of
8The OECD de￿nes a commitment as ￿a ￿rm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds,
undertaken by an o¢ cial donor to provide speci￿ed assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organisation.
Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the
completion of disbursements.￿ A disbursement is de￿ned as ￿the release of funds to, or the purchase of goods or
services for a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer
of ￿nancial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor.￿
14purpose, are classi￿ed as ￿short-impact.￿ This springs from the belief that it is at least possible
that money provided as budget support could be spent in such a way as to in￿ uence growth within
a small number of years. The remaining two ￿pre￿x￿categories, ￿investment project￿and ￿other
resource provision,￿ are divided by purpose as above. This additional classi￿cation results in an
alternative, somewhat more re￿ned three-way division of aggregate aid we call ￿De￿nition 2.￿The
￿De￿nition 2￿aid measures in each category are very highly correlated with those using ￿De￿nition
1.￿While we use de￿nition 2 in all of our regressions, we will make use of De￿nition 1 when checking
the validity of these disbursement estimates.
Having thus classi￿ed the 275,590 donor-recipient aid transactions in the CRS database from
1973-2001 as short-impact, long-impact, or humanitarian,9 we then aggregate these by recipient
country so that each recipient in each year has an observation for each of the three types. Table
1 summarizes this classi￿cation for aid in the 1997-2001 period, disaggregating only to OECD￿ s
three-digit level. In that period, about 8% of aid was humanitarian, and the remainder split roughly
equally between short-impact and long-impact.10 Appendix Table 1 shows our full classi￿cation of
all the ￿ve-digit CRS categories as short-impact, long-impact, or humanitarian. We omit donor￿ s
administrative costs from all of our aid measures.
The second step is to assume that the fraction of disbursements in each of our three aid categories
in a given period is equal to the fraction of commitments in each category in that period. For example,
























where ds is ￿short-impact￿ gross disbursements, dagg is aggregate gross aid disbursements, and
c represents commitments of the various types. Naturally, (6) will di⁄er from equality the more
commitment fractions of each type vary over time, the longer the delay between commitment and
disbursement, and the more variation in this delay there is between di⁄erent aid types.
Thus the third step is to check how well (6) approximates true disbursements of short-impact
aid. As noted above, the CRS database does contain some information on disbursements classi￿ed
9We eliminate from our aid measure the miniscule fraction of aid classi￿ed by the CRS as ￿nancing donors￿
administrative expenses. In 1997-2001, this was roughly 0.1% of aid.
10Since each three-digit category includes multiple ￿ve-digit categories, many contain multiple types of aid. To
illustrate this, we include in the table as an example the full ￿ve-digit breakdown of code 220, ￿communications￿. We
take ￿telecommunications￿(code 22020) to be short-impact aid, except for a small portion that is given as technical
cooperation. Support for ￿communications policy￿ (code 22010) is considered long-impact aid, except for a small
portion that is given as program aid or budget support.
15by purpose for the 1990s. We therefore use our method to estimate disaggregated disbursements
using disaggregated commitments data for the 1990s, and compare the estimates to the true values.
One minor complication in this enterprise is that for the disaggregated disbursements of the 1990s,
the CRS disaggregates aid disbursements only by purpose and not according to whether they were
technical cooperation, program support, and so on (the ￿pre￿x￿code). That is, the CRS only allows
us to disaggregate disbursements in the 1990s according to De￿nition 1, not De￿nition 2. Though
we will use the more re￿ned De￿nition 2 in all regressions, we employ De￿nition 1 to assess the
validity of our approximations.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for actual and estimated disaggregated aid ￿ ows. The units of
observation are single years. The ￿rst two lines show net and gross aggregate ODA for the 1990s. The
next three lines summarize estimated disbursements for the 1990s according to (6), where the three
categories of aid have been delimited by De￿nition 1. These are comparable to the summary statistics
for actual disbursements immediately below. Following these are summary statistics for estimated
disbursements according to De￿nition 2. The numbers suggest that 1) our estimation procedure
is capturing a great deal of information about true disaggregated disbursements, and 2) De￿nition
1 aid barely di⁄ers from De￿nition 2 aid. The bottom half of the table reports similar summary
statistics for the entire 1973-2001 period, omitting of course the unobserved actual disaggregated
disbursements during that period.
Figure 1 plots actual disbursements of each type against our estimates, both using De￿nition 1
and covering the 1990s. The ￿gures suggest that our estimates are in fact highly correlated with
disaggregated disbursements of each type. As expected, humanitarian aid is not predicted quite as
well, since much emergency aid is not formally committed prior to disbursement. Table 3 shows
Pearson￿ s correlation coe¢ cients among the various types of estimates and actual aid in the 1990s.
The highlighted cells reveal that our estimation method predicts disaggregated disbursements to a
high degree of accuracy, particularly in the case of short-impact disbursements.
We are only able to test the relationship between estimated and actual short-impact aid in the
1990s but not over the entire period 1973-2001. If some part of the 1990s represents an atypical sam-
ple of the commitment-disbursement relationship during the entire period, this could systematically
bias our results. To partially address this issue, we bootstrap the 1990s data to determine whether
or not subsamples of the 1990s data give signi￿cantly di⁄erent results. We draw 694 observations
with replacement to calculate the correlation coe¢ cient, and repeat this exercise 1,000 times. This
allows us to construct bias-corrected con￿dence intervals (see Efron and Tibshirani 1994) for the
correlations in Table 3. The 95% con￿dence interval for the correlation between actual and estimated
16(De￿nition 1) short-impact aid is (0.82, 0.89), for long-impact aid (0.72, 0.84), and humanitarian
aid (0.50, 0.80). The fact that our prediction of actual disaggregated disbursements remains strong
in subsamples of the 1990s reinforces our application of the same estimation technique to earlier
decades.
Certainly there are many other ways in which the CRS disaggregated commitments data could
be exploited to yield disaggregated disbursement estimates besides the simple method of (6). We
































t is commitments of short-impact aid made a time t, whether or not they are ever disbursed
and c
s;￿
t is commitments of short-impact aid made at time t and which are disbursed as planned at
time ￿. The subscript i is omitted for clarity. The ￿rst two terms of the summation are known from
the CRS database for the entire period 1973-2001. The ￿nal term could be estimated from the 1990s
disbursement data, since each purpose-disaggregated disbursement reports the year in which it was
committed, and assumed to hold for all 28 years. This method, and others like it, did not yield
estimates that matched actual disbursements data as well as method (6) by criteria of correlation
and mean squared error. The complexity of (7) is likely to blame. Estimation of each parenthetical
term introduces a measurement error, compounded by multiplication. In practice, furthermore, an
additional estimated scaling factor must be used to account for the fact that the dataset contains
a ￿nite number of years￿ introducing yet more error to the product. After testing this and many
other similar methods we selected (6) as superior.
4 Core results
We regress growth on aid in a manner typical of the aid-growth literature, but simply use a measure
of aid that has some possibility of a⁄ecting growth within the period of observation: short-impact
aid. Table 4 presents our core result: short-impact aid causes short-run growth, and does so to a
much greater degree than previous estimates on aggregate aid.
Column 1 of Table 4 essentially follows the practice of many previous studies: average growth in
real GDP per capita is regressed on aggregate net aid (gross aid minus repayments), aggregate net aid
squared, and initial GDP per capita. Aid is instrumented, here and in the rest of the table, by all the
independent variables supplemented with instruments drawn from Hansen and Tarp (2001). These
17are a dummy for Egypt, arms imports, a lagged policy index11 and its square, population interacted
with policy, GDP and its square interacted with policy, and each of the lagged aid variables and the
lagged aid variables interacted with policy. The coe¢ cient on ￿net￿aid is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero.
In column 2 we make one change: we substitute gross short-impact aid for net aggregate aid.
The coe¢ cient roughly triples in magnitude and becomes signi￿cant at the 5% level. Diminishing
returns are evident in the squared term, also signi￿cant. This minimal model obviously omits
several important growth factors, and accordingly Hansen￿ s (1982) J statistic rejects exogeneity of
the instruments at the 5% level. But the large change in the coe¢ cient on aid suggests that there
is indeed growth information contained in the short-impact aid ￿ ows.
Column 3 adds a control for repayments on aid, per equation (5),12 as well as a set of covariates
central to the most prominent papers in the recent aid-growth literature. These consist of a unique
intercept for East Asian countries,13 an index of institutional quality from the International Country
Risk Guide, and indicators of monetary, ￿scal, and trade policy.14 The Hansen test now fails to
reject exogeneity of the instruments. Column 4 allows tropical countries an idiosyncratic intercept
(similarly to Dalgaard et al. 2004), includes log life expectancy as in Radelet, Sachs and Lee (2001)
inter alia to capture broader health conditions, and includes controls for civil war as in Collier and
Hoe› er (2002). Throughout, the signs of the coe¢ cient estimates are intuitive: being in East Asia,
scoring 1 for the Sachs and Warner (1995) ￿openness￿indicator, a higher ICRG institutional quality
index, health conditions conducive to longer life expectancy, and recovering from civil warfare are
all associated with more rapid growth. Location in the tropics, higher in￿ ation, and current civil
war are associated with slower growth. Running a smaller budget de￿cit is correlated with faster
growth, though not to a statistically signi￿cant degree. Note that almost all of the right-hand side
variables are highly statistically signi￿cant, and that they jointly explain about 38% of the variance
in growth rates. We are con￿dent that this set of regressors represents a signi￿cant improvement
over past research on aid in terms of explaining economic growth.
11Constructed as a linear combination of the three policy variables included in our preferred speci￿cation￿ budget
balance, openness variable and in￿ation. Weights are determined using the method of Burnside and Dollar (2000).
12Essentially the entire aid-growth literature has used some form of net aid ￿ow as its regressor (with the exception
of Mosley et al. 1987, who do not control for repayments). Since it is meaningless to disaggregate repayments by
purpose, we must set aside repayments as a separate regressor. Repayments on aid are assumed to have a nonlinear
e⁄ect through the log operator, but are not allowed a parabolic term since this presumes that a su¢ cient quantity of
repayments could actually increase growth. We relax and test this assumption in a later table.
13￿ East Asia￿is Rep. of Korea, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
14Hansen and Tarp (2000) and Burnside and Dollar (2000), among others, include an East Asia dummy, in￿ation,
budget balance, and the ￿openness￿ indicator of Sachs and Warner (1995). Collier and Dollar (2002) use the same
ICRGE institutional quality index used herein. Burnside and Dollar (2004) use a similar institutional quality measure
that is highly correlated with the ICRGE index.
18Controlling for these other factors only strengthens the observed conditional relationship between
short-impact aid and growth, which grows in magnitude and becomes signi￿cant at the 1% level.
This result is not driven by in￿ uential observations, as Figure 2 reveals. The procedure of Hadi
(1992) classi￿es four observations in column 4 as outliers at the 5% level: Gabon 1974-77, Jordan
1986-89, Nicaragua 1994-97, and Zambia 1994-1997. Removing these observations only strengthens
the ￿t, as the ￿gure shows and as column 5 of Table 4 demonstrates. The test of Arellano and Bond
(1991) for ￿rst-order autocorrelated errors rejects the hypothesis of no ￿rst-order autocorrelation
at the 5% level but fails to reject hypotheses of no second and no higher-order autocorrelation.
Clustered standard errors are thus used throughout the table.
The test of Pagan and Hall (1983) rejects the hypothesis of homoskedastic errors in column 5 at
the 5% level, suggesting that the generalized method of moments will yield more e¢ cient inference
than two-stage least squares (Baum et al. 2003). Column 6 reports the GMM results. The coe¢ cient
on short-impact aid is essentially unchanged. Life expectancy enters signi￿cantly at the 1% level.
The convergence term is negative, though not statistically signi￿cant. While we consider the GMM
estimates to be of interest as a check on our ￿ndings, we retain 2SLS as our core speci￿cation for most
of the remaining analysis because 1) using GMM does not materially a⁄ect the coe¢ cient estimates
of interest, 2) 2SLS facilitates comparisons to most of the extant aid-growth literature, 3) 2SLS is
a more transparent estimator to most of our audience, and 4) no systematic procedure comparable
to Hadi￿ s exists for identifying in￿ uential observations in a GMM setting. Thus we consider column
￿ve of Table 4￿ using 2SLS and excluding the four outliers￿ as our core result.
The magnitude of the coe¢ cient on gross short-impact aid in columns 5 and 6, exceeding 0.9,
is much higher than that estimated on net aggregate aid in nearly all preceding studies. We will
explore the magnitude of the e⁄ect much further, below. The statistical signi￿cance of the e⁄ect
is not an artifact of autocorrelation, weak or endogenous instruments, in￿ uential observations, or
reverse causation of aid by growth. In the next section we test the robustness of the result to changes
in speci￿cation, potential endogeneity of other regressors, and further modi￿cations. Moreover, we
recognize that by using short-impact aid as the only aid measure on the right-hand side, we are
implicitly assuming that the current growth e⁄ects of long-impact and humanitarian aid in equation
(5) are zero. In the next section we relax and critique these assumptions as well.
195 Robustness of the core result
Cross-country growth regressions are not in fashion. This fact alone is insu¢ cient reason to forsake
cross-country analysis entirely in exclusive favor of country case studies incapable of informing donors
about the e⁄ectiveness of their overall aid portfolios. We choose instead to address as thoroughly as
we can the shortcomings of most cross-country analyses that have disa⁄ected many of their former
admirers.
Temple (1999) summarizes several widespread concerns about fragility in cross-country growth
regressions. These include but are not limited to sensitivity to speci￿cation, parameter heterogene-
ity, endogenous regressors and instruments, measurement error, in￿ uential observations, and spatial
and temporal correlation of errors. Along these lines, Roodman (2003) and Easterly, Levine and
Roodman (2004) challenge the entire modern cross-country aid-growth literature, revealing the sen-
sitivity of most (but not all) recent empirical results to in￿ uential observations, speci￿cation, and
estimator. These two papers have permanently raised the credibility bar that all subsequent studies
must clear. In this section we explore all of Temple￿ s critiques and others. The ￿nding of a positive,
causal relationship between aid and growth is robust throughout.
5.1 Omitted variables
It is possible that ￿short-impact￿aid acting as a proxy for other types of aid that may have been
improperly omitted from the regression. It is also possible that the coe¢ cient on ￿short-impact￿
aid is biased due to the omission of some variable that causes both ￿short-impact￿aid and growth
simultaneously.
In all preceding discussion we have used short-impact aid as our preferred measure of aid ￿ ows,
implicitly assuming that long-impact aid and humanitarian aid do not have short-run e⁄ects on
growth. We now relax and test this assumption. Table 5 begins by estimating the growth impact
of aggregate gross ODA, controlling for log repayments on aid. The magnitude of the estimated
coe¢ cient is similar to that found in many papers in the ￿unconditional￿strand of the literature,
such as Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001). Column 2 then splits gross ODA into the three types,
estimating the unrestricted model in equation (5). The standard error on the short-impact aid
coe¢ cient increases, likely due in part to the high correlation between short-impact and long-impact
aid seen in Table 3, but short-impact aid remains signi￿cant at the 10% level. When the coe¢ cient
on long-impact aid is restricted to zero (column 3), the coe¢ cient on short-impact aid increases
slightly and the standard error falls notably, suggesting indeed that the standard error in column
202 was in￿ ated by collinearity. The four-year growth e⁄ect of humanitarian aid is indistinguishable
from zero, and is thus restricted to zero in column 4.
Together, these results con￿rm the validity of our earlier exclusion of long-impact and human-
itarian aid. This restriction increases the e¢ ciency of our inference on the e⁄ects of short-term
aid without a⁄ecting the qualitative conclusion that the e⁄ect of short-impact aid is much larger
than that of aggregate aid or the other types of aid individually. Even though short-impact aid and
long-impact aid levels are typically correlated to a degree of 0.635, the coe¢ cient on short-impact
aid is not substantially biased upwards by excluding long-impact aid from the regression.
Table 6 asks whether some observable time-variant country characteristic that may cause both
aid and growth has been improperly omitted from the regression. To begin, we explore the nonlinear
relationship between repayments on aid and growth. As discussed above, we chose a logarithmic
model for repayments out of distaste for the idea of a parabolic turning point past which any level
of repayments helps growth. This introduces an asymmetry in the model, however, since we model
the nonlinear impact of all gross aid in￿ ows as parabolic. In column 1, repayments are allowed a
parabolic e⁄ect. The coe¢ cient on short-impact aid only increases; our core ￿nding is una⁄ected by
the change.
The balance of the table introduces several other variables found relevant in di⁄erent strands
of the empirical growth literature. These are land area and coastline (e.g. Radelet, Sachs and Lee
2001), secondary school enrollment (which e.g. Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992 favor over primary
enrollment as an input to their overall human capital measure) the Sachs and Warner (2000) indicator
of natural resource abundance, Collier and Dehn￿ s (2001) positive and negative commodity shock
indices, and a measure of current and lagged natural disasters.
In four of the ￿ve cases the coe¢ cient on short-impact aid is entirely una⁄ected. Only in the
case of the Collier-Dehn commodity shock is the coe¢ cient slightly diminished (though not to a
statistically signi￿cant degree). This result is broadly consistent with Collier and Dehn￿ s ￿ndings
of an interaction e⁄ect between these shocks and aid, a result robust to the recent analysis of
Roodman. Since the commodity shock variables were both statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level,
we considered using this speci￿cation as our core result, but since including these variables led to
a loss of 59 observations we use it as a cross-check rather than as the core. Importantly, we note
that the coe¢ cient on short-impact aid remains large and signi￿cant even when controlling for these
shocks in the absence of an interaction term. This is at variance with Collier and Dehn￿ s results,
in which the ￿net￿ aid term without an interaction with shocks is statistically insigni￿cant. We
21￿nd that the insigni￿cance of the ￿net￿aid term in Collier and Dehn is because the majority of
￿ ows comprised by their aggregate aid measure could not meaningfully a⁄ect growth within a four-
year period. This is an apt demonstration of our statement on the ￿conditional￿literature: we do
not deny that the e⁄ect of aid is heterogeneous across countries￿ on the contrary we do ￿nd some
evidence for it in the next section￿ but we ￿nd that accounting for this heterogeneity is not at all
necessary to detect the impact of foreign aid in macroeconomic data.
Table 7 asks whether some unobserved, time-invariant country characteristic causing both growth
and aid has been improperly omitted from the regression. The regressions are identical to columns
5 and 6 of Table 4, except that both sides have been di⁄erenced to eliminate country ￿xed e⁄ects.
Variables in bold type are instrumented in Anderson-Hsiao fashion with the twice-lagged level of
the variable in question. The ￿rst two columns use two-stage least squares and the more e¢ cient
GMM; the third and fourth columns repeat those regressions now instrumenting for initial GDP per
capita as a check on dynamic panel bias. The ￿rst thing to note is that instrumentation for aid is
poor. The Shea partial R2 for aid does not rise above 0.178. Weak instrumentation means that we
do not expect high power from this test. Aid is nevertheless signi￿cant at the 10% level, and the
coe¢ cient estimate does not fall below 0.564.
5.2 Endogenous instruments
It is furthermore possible that some of our instruments for aid have been improperly omitted from the
regression. The two-stage least squares estimator cannot yield unbiased coe¢ cient estimates if even
one of the instruments for current aid has a distinct e⁄ect on growth apart from the e⁄ect realized
by acting through current aid. Here we address the issue in four ways: Hansen￿ s J-test, running the
regressions without any instruments, changing the instrument set, and including lagged versions of
potentially endogenous instruments in the main regression. The lesson of the exercise is that the
statistical signi￿cance of the results in Table 4 is not dependent on endogenous instruments. The
magnitude of the coe¢ cient on aid, however, may be biased upward by endogeneity in the instrument
set; the true magnitude of the coe¢ cient on ￿short-impact￿aid is, conservatively, about 0.5.
First, the regressions of Table 4 report the results of Hansen￿ s test of the null hypothesis of no
correlation between the instrument matrix and the observed residuals of the main regression, and
in all cases fails to reject the null. Like all tests of exclusion restrictions, however, the test is only
valid if at least one instrument is truly exogenous. Intuitively, this is because we cannot test for
correlation between the instruments and the true error term but only between the instruments and
22the observed residuals, whose values are only white noise to the extent that the instruments are
valid.
Second, we report OLS results in Table 8. Here we address the endogeneity of aid without
any instruments. Aid can be endogenous for two reasons: because growth causes aid (reverse
causation) or because an omitted variables causes both growth and aid (simultaneous causation).
In the ￿rst column of Table 8, we eliminate the possibility of reverse causation by lagging aid one
period. Uninstrumented, lagged ￿short-impact￿ aid remains signi￿cant at the 1% level, though
with a coe¢ cient estimate of only 0.484. This estimate is biased upward to the extent that there
are omitted variables positively correlated with both aid and growth, and is biased downward to
the extent that there are omitted variables positively correlated with aid but negatively correlated
with growth. Column 2 includes indicators of terms of trade shocks and natural disasters, both of
which might be associated with lower growth but higher aid ￿ ows, and as expected, the coe¢ cient on
￿short-impact￿aid increases. Column 3 runs the regression from column 1 in di⁄erences, to eliminate
country ￿xed e⁄ects that may be biasing the coe¢ cient on aid upwards (donor-friendly countries
may, for example, both receive more aid and possess trade ties that encourage growth). But in
fact the elimination of country ￿xed e⁄ects only increases the aid coe¢ cient, to 0.679. Di⁄erencing
introduces the possibility of additional dynamic panel bias, however, so column 4 instruments for
change in initial GDP per capita with its twice-lagged level; aid remains signi￿cant at 5%. The
￿nal column includes ￿long-impact￿aid in the di⁄erenced regression and, since the Pagan-Hall test
rejects homoskedastic errors, uses GMM for more e¢ cient estimation. ￿Long-impact￿aid has no
discernable e⁄ect on growth within four years, while ￿short-impact￿aid remains signi￿cant at the
5% level.
These results suggest that although the statistical signi￿cance of ￿short-impact￿aid in Table 4
does not depend on endogenous instruments, the magnitude of the e⁄ect measured therein may be
biased upward. That is, if lagged ￿short-impact￿aid has a direct e⁄ect on growth, it is improper
to use it as an instrument for current ￿short-impact￿ aid and to exclude it from the regression.
This would bias the coe¢ cient on aid upwards. Table 8 suggests that this e⁄ect may bias the
￿short-impact￿aid coe¢ cient upward from a true value of roughly 0.5.
Third, we attempted to drop lagged aid from the set of instruments used in Table 4 and replace
it with several other variables with the potential to instrument well for aid. These included included
several variables shown by Alesina and Dollar (2000) to be determinants of aid ￿ ows, such as an
index of civil liberties and political rights, correlations between donor and recipient voting patterns
in the UN, and years spent as a colony. We also tried a dummy for Eastern Europe, voting share
23in IDA, illiteracy rate, and lagged administrative costs of donors, its squared, and both of these
interacted with the policy index. None of these, however, were su¢ ciently highly correlated with
￿short-impact￿ aid to instrument well for it. The Shea partial R2 for ￿short-impact￿ aid never
exceeded 0.1 with any instrument matrix we attempted that did not include lagged ￿short-impact￿
aid. We thus do not report these results as any tests based on such instruments would necessarily
have low power.
Fourth, it is possible to estimate the magnitude of the potential bias by taking advantage of the
serial correlation of the aid variable. To explore this somewhat complex issue, note ￿rst that a growth
event must follow an aid event if it is to be caused by that aid event, and if growth and aid events
are evenly distributed during a four-year period the average lag between an aid disbursement and
a subsequent growth event is only sixteen months.15 Certainly a project funding women￿ s fertility
outreach or broad-based reform of the education ministry could not a⁄ect economic growth in such
a short time.16
But it is not that simple. As Roodman (2003, footnote 16) discusses, measurements of aid
disbursed in the current four-year period could contain information about previous periods￿dis-
bursements to the extent that aid levels are persistent across periods. These earlier disbursements
would have longer than sixteen months to a⁄ect growth before the measurement. This issue is not
speci￿c to aid￿ the same is true for any regressor that varies over time, including in￿ ation, trade
policy, life expectancy, or education levels. Letting ￿ be the interperiod correlation between aid
levels, the average lag between a growth event in the current period and a prior aid event measured
by an increase in current aid is
4=3 + 4￿ + 8￿2 + 12￿3 + ￿￿￿
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When ￿ = 0.65, the observed interperiod correlation for short-impact aid in our dataset, this average
lag is 7.9 years. In other words, a change in short-impact aid measured for the current four-year
period precedes by an average of eight years any measured change in growth during the current




















3, where tg and ta are the years of growth and aid events.
16Naturally aid will have some e⁄ect on GDP at the moment it is spent; speci￿cally, GDP increases by the domestic
value added contained in domestically-produced goods and services purchased with aid (GDP does not increase at all
when aid is spent on imported goods and services). As long as the time between receipt and expenditure of ￿short-
impact￿(e.g. for roads) does not di⁄er systematically from that of ￿long-impact￿aid (e.g. for schools) by more than
a ￿scal year, however, this e⁄ect does not di⁄er between the two types of aid.
24increase in current aggregate aid conveys information about aggregate aid ￿ ows that occurred an
average of 19 years prior to the observed growth in the current period.
This does not mean, however, that using panels with very short windows of observation is su¢ -
cient to fully capture the e⁄ects of a policy intervention if only that intervention is highly correlated
across periods. The serial correlation has a cost, which is that it becomes more di¢ cult to separate
the short-run and long-run impacts of aid, and short-term ￿ uctuations in current growth can ob-
scure the growth impacts of both. To ensure that the coe¢ cient on short-impact aid is accurately
capturing the short-run e⁄ects of short-impact aid, we must account for persistence in short-impact
aid and cross-correlation between short-impact and long-impact.
To see this, suppose for example that the true regression model resembles (5) with two extra
terms (abstracting away from the quadratic terms):
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This has the virtue of capturing more of the long-run e⁄ects of aid, but has the drawback of
poorly re￿ ecting recent changes in aid levels. We thus measure with less accuracy a more compre-
hensive growth e⁄ect. If we run regression (9) instead of (5), we measure with more accuracy a
less comprehensive growth e⁄ect. In that case we ensure that ￿
s captures more fully the short-run
impacts of more recent innovations in the aid level, but we sacri￿ce measurement of the long-run
impacts of either type of aid.
At any rate, we must run some version of (9) in order to properly interpret the coe¢ cient on
short-impact aid form our core regression. Column 5 in Table 5 displays a representative result. We
include twice-lagged short-impact and twice-lagged long-impact aid on the right-hand side, allowing
innovations in short-impact aid an average of nine years and four months to realize their e⁄ect (16
months in the current period plus four years in each lagged period). The coe¢ cient on short-impact
aid is smaller, at 0.564, though still much larger than that for aggregate aid and still statistically
signi￿cant.17 The result indicates that roughly two thirds of the coe¢ cient we measure on short-
impact aid in the core regression re￿ ects the short-run (roughly nine year) impact of short-impact
17Column 5 loses several observations because the inclusion of twice-lagged variables requires dropping the earliest
period for which data are available. Without excluding in￿uential observations identi￿ed by the Hadi procedure, the
linear coe¢ cient on short-impact aid is 0.636 with a standard error of 0.225.
25aid. The coe¢ cient is not primarily serving as a proxy for the long-run impacts of short-impact aid
nor for the long-run impacts of long-impact aid.
Collectively, the results of Table 5 suggest that, out of short-impact aid￿ s marginal growth e⁄ect
of roughly 0.9, approximately 0.1 actually re￿ ects long-run e⁄ects of earlier long-impact aid and
approximately 0.2 re￿ ects long-run e⁄ects of earlier short-impact aid. Roughly 0.5 or 0.6 represents
exclusively the true current marginal growth impact of current changes in ￿short-impact￿aid levels.
To err on the conservative side, when later entering into a detailed discussion of the magnitude of the
aid e⁄ect we will use the coe¢ cient estimates from the ￿rst column of Table 8￿ where the coe¢ cient
on ￿short-impact￿aid is 0.484 and on ￿short-impact￿aid squared is ￿0:0275.
5.3 Parameter heterogeneity and endogenous regressors
Pesaran and Smith (1995) point out that if the coe¢ cient on aid is heterogeneous across countries￿
and doubtlessly it is￿ dynamic panel regressions will lead to inconsistent results if aid is ￿rst-order
serially correlated since this will induce ￿rst-order serial correlation of the disturbances. The current
disturbance will then be correlated with lagged growth, which in turn is correlated with period-initial
GDP per capita, biasing all the coe¢ cients including the coe¢ cient on aid. Intuitively, correlation of
the errors arises because parameter heterogeneity implies an omitted interaction term between the
regressor of interest and some other country characteristic. This becomes part of the error, and since
the regressor of interest is serially correlated, the error will be serially correlated as well. Since the
lagged dependent variable is correlated with the lagged error, serial correlation of the error means
that the contemporaneous error too will be correlated with the lagged dependent variable on the
right hand side. In other words, parameter heterogeneity produces endogeneity bias in the presence
of 1) a serially correlated regressor and 2) a lagged dependent variable.
This is particularly important since the ￿conditional￿strand of the literature has argued that
e⁄ect of aid on growth is not homogenous across groups. But it is certainly not the only reason to
believe that some of our regressors may be endogenous. Up to this point we have instrumented only
for aid, aid squared, and repayments on aid. It is certainly reasonable to think that growth outcomes
could reverse-cause in￿ ation, budget balance, and components of the Sachs-Warner indicator within
a four-year horizon. It is even possible that institutional quality could be a⁄ected within a short
time horizon by extraordinary growth performance.
Table 9 begins by instrumenting for initial GDP per capita in our 2SLS core regression.18 Notably,
the magnitude of the convergence e⁄ect increases (though it is not statistically signi￿cant), suggesting
18Here and in the rest of the table, the instrument set includes those instruments used previously for aid plus
26that indeed there is some dynamic panel bias present in the earlier results. Instrumented variables
are in bold type. The coe¢ cient on short-impact aid is diminished, but to a small and statistically
insigni￿cant degree. Column 2 instruments also for institutional quality, in￿ ation, budget balance,
and the Sachs-Warner indicator. Hansen￿ s J statistic and Shea￿ s partial R2 value suggest that
the instrument set is, appropriately, exogenous but correlated with the endogenous variables. All
variables retain their signs and magnitudes, and the convergence e⁄ect becomes signi￿cant at the
10% level. The coe¢ cient on short-impact aid is again slightly diminished, but not to a statistically
signi￿cant degree.
There is evidence to suggest that growth outcomes can be a determinant of civil wars, even in
the short term (Collier and Hoe› er 2000), though causality is not ￿rmly established. Our dataset
did not permit proper instrumentation of civil war occurrence, so we cannot directly address the
possible endogeneity of civil war. We consider it unlikely, however, that correlation between the war
variable and the error term greatly biases our estimates of the coe¢ cient on aid. Columns 3 and 6
in Table 9 reveals that excluding civil war from the regression entirely does not materially a⁄ect the
aid result.
Finally, the Pagan-Hall test rejects the hypothesis of homoskedasticity in the 2SLS results of
columns 1 to 3, suggesting the corresponding GMM estimates of columns 4 to 6 may be more
e¢ cient. The conclusions about the coe¢ cient on aid are not substantially a⁄ected. Note also the
signi￿cance of the convergence term.
5.4 Measurement error and aid fungibility
A frequent critique of growth regressions is the possibility that measurement error in the regressor
of interest could lead to biased coe¢ cients and misinterpretation of the results. Figure 1 makes clear
that our estimation technique introduces a degree of random error into the short-impact aid regressor,
and even the OECD database underlying the technique could contain omissions or incorrect values.
Notwithstanding all of these concerns, we instrument (well) for short-impact aid. This reduces the
likelihood that the coe¢ cient estimate on short-impact aid is attenuated by measurement error.
One type of measurement error of particular salience in the present case is the possible ￿fungi-
bility￿of aid ￿ ows. An assumption implicit to this entire exercise is that aid intended to ￿nance
certain sectors (e.g., building roads) does so to some degree￿ i.e. that aid is not fully fungible across
sectors. A signi￿cant body of literature argues that aid is, in fact, highly fungible.
once-lagged values of all variables assumed endogenous. This is appropriate, since an Arellano and Bond (1991) test
fails to reject the hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation of errors in all regressions at the 5% level.
27Internal World Bank discussion recognized some degree of fungibility as early as 1947 (Devarajan
et al. 1999). An in￿ uential piece by Singer (1965) agreed that the donors engage in some degree of
￿make-believe￿and ￿self-deception￿if they think that aid actually ￿nances that which it is intended
to ￿nance. Soon thereafter, Gri¢ n (1970, p. 103) concludes that ￿foreign capital was ￿nancing not
the project to which it was apparently tied but ... the least attractive, or marginal, project.￿
A large body of empirical research since then has sought to measure the exact degree to which aid
in￿ uences overall government spending (or is passed along to the private sector in tax breaks), the
broad composition of spending (consumption versus investment), and the precise sectoral allocation
of investment spending. Perfect fungibility along any of these dimensions would certainly make the
present analysis impossible; either short-impact aid would have the same impact as aggregate aid,
or neither would have any impact on public investment at all. We believe that this is not a problem
for our analysis, for two reasons.
First, a reasonable conclusion from this literature￿ surveyed in Devarajan and Swaroop (1998)
and McGillivray and Morrissey (2000)￿ is that aid is partially fungible. In most developing coun-
tries most of the time, aid does not go mostly to tax breaks, and aid ￿nances capital and current
expenditures in roughly equal amounts. While the intersectoral fungibility of earmarked sectoral aid
varies greatly by sector (e.g. Feyzioglu et al. 1996) and by country, the empirical literature does not
￿nd aid to be fully fungible. To the extent that earmarked sectoral aid is partially fungible, short-
impact aid is merely a noisy measure of recipient governments￿true expenditure on short-impact
investment. But as long as this measurement error is uncorrelated with growth shocks, the only
e⁄ect on the estimated short-impact aid coe¢ cient would be an attenuation bias. This would make
our estimated coe¢ cient a lower bound on the true coe¢ cient.
Second, and more simply, we ￿nd a clear and statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between the e⁄ect
of aggregate gross aid on growth and that of short-impact aid. If aid were perfectly fungible along
any of the aforementioned dimensions, this would not be possible.
5.5 In￿ uential observations
Earlier discussion of Figure 1 and columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 reveal that the coe¢ cient estimates
for short-impact aid are not driven by in￿ uential observations in aid-growth space. On the contrary,
eliminating in￿ uential observations identi￿ed by the Hadi procedure only strengthens the correlation
between instrumented aid and growth.
It is nevertheless possible, however, that the result is driven by a few in￿ uential observations in
28a di⁄erent dimension. The partial scatter of growth against aid is, after all, conditional on all of
the values of all other regressors. In theory, a few highly in￿ uential observations in, for example,
in￿ ation-growth space could a⁄ect the partial distribution of aid and growth even if no observations
are visibly in￿ uential in aid-growth space.
To eliminate this possibility we bootstrap the sample used in our core 2SLS regression result,
column 5 of Table 4. We run 1,000 iterations, and each time draw 368 observations with replacement
and run the regression. This generates 1,000 estimated coe¢ cient vectors. Since many of the
resulting coe¢ cient distributions fail standard tests of normality, Table 10 reports bias-corrected
95% con￿dence intervals for all coe¢ cients. The lower end of the interval for the linear short-impact
aid coe¢ cient, for example, is higher than the lower bound implied by the standard errors in columns
5 and 6 of Table 4. In other words, the exercise detects no subsample of the 368 observations in
which the e⁄ect of short-impact aid on growth is lower than that present in the full sample.
5.6 Serially correlated errors
While the Arellano-Bond test detects ￿rst-order serial correlation of errors in our core speci￿cation
and many others, we address this in two ways. First, we use clustered errors throughout the analysis
to ensure that this does not arti￿cially in￿ ate t-statistics. Second, since serial correlation in the pres-
ence of lagged dependent variables can give rise to dynamic panel bias, we instrument for variables
not strictly exogenous in Table 9. Our inference on the aid coe¢ cients in both cases is materially
una⁄ected.
6 Interpreting the coe¢ cient estimates
6.1 Heterogeneity in the aid e⁄ect
Table 11 asks whether the e⁄ect of short-impact aid on growth is conditional on an interaction with
other included regressors, or is dependent on the time period analyzed. The ￿rst 11 columns simply
add to the right hand side an interaction term between aid and each of the other regressors, one at
a time. The magnitude and signi￿cance of the short-impact aid term is una⁄ected in all but two of
these regressions.
Notably, the aid e⁄ect does not interact with the level of GDP per capita; we ￿nd no evidence
that aid works any better or any worse in the poorest countries, all else equal. Nor does the short-
impact aid e⁄ect interact with the tropics dummy, at variance with the ￿ndings of Dalgaard et al.
29(2004) on aggregate aid.19 In the ￿nal two columns, we also ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant evidence
that the growth e⁄ect of aid varies across decades, though the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients and
standard errors suggest that there may have been a somewhat smaller e⁄ect in the 1980s and a
somewhat larger e⁄ect in the 1990s.
In columns 4 and 7, however, the coe¢ cient on aid changes greatly in magnitude and signi￿cance
upon inclusion of interaction term. This suggests that there is in fact a meaningful di⁄erence in
the way that short-impact aid a⁄ects growth between countries with di⁄erent health conditions
(proxied by life expectancy) and di⁄erent degrees of institutional quality (proxied by the ICRG
index). Neither interaction is, however, statistically signi￿cant.
A key lesson of Roodman (2003) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) is that interaction
terms of this kind deserve scrutiny. Table 12 takes a more detailed look at ￿ve interaction terms of
interest, in ￿ve pairs of regressions. The ￿rst of each pair uses Hadi￿ s procedure to identify in￿ uential
observations in interaction term-growth space and runs the 2SLS estimator without them. The
second of each pair tests this subsample using a GMM estimator.
In columns 1 and 2, we again see no evidence that short-impact aid a⁄ects growth di⁄erently
in the poorest developing countries than it does in richer ones. In columns 3 and 4, in the absence
of in￿ uential observations on aid ￿ tropics dummy there is a marked change in the aid term upon
inclusion of the interaction, though in the more e¢ cient GMM estimate the short-impact aid coe¢ -
cient is still positive and signi￿cant. Its value, 0.605, is not statistically di⁄erent from the coe¢ cient
estimate in column 6 of Table 4. The interaction term, furthermore, negative but is not statisti-
cally signi￿cant even in the absence of in￿ uential observations. We thus see some suggestion that
short-impact aid may be less e⁄ective in the tropics than elsewhere, in general agreement with the
thrust of the ￿ndings of Dalgaard et al. (2004) on aggregate aid. We do not ￿nd, however, that this
heterogeneity in the relationship between short-impact aid and growth is statistically signi￿cant nor
that it is necessary to detection of the overall aid-growth relationship.
Columns 5 and 6 ￿nd that there is a robust interaction between the short-impact aid e⁄ect
and health conditions in the country, proxied by life expectancy. When in￿ uential observations are
removed from interaction-growth space in column 4 of Table 11, the result is column 5 of Table
12: the interaction term is large, positive, and signi￿cant at the 5% level. A more e¢ cient GMM
estimate con￿rms the relationship in column 6.20 The magnitude of the interaction coe¢ cient in
19Dalgaard et al. use fraction of land in the tropics, which correlates closely with a tropics dummy.
20A Pagan-Hall test rejects the hypothesis of homoskedastic errors at the 10% level (￿2
30 = 41:1, p-value = 0.0858)
30column 6 implies that coe¢ cient for short-impact aid on growth in the lowest life expectancy country
(34.8 years) is ￿ 2.32 + (0.748 ￿ ln(34.8)) = 0.334. Likewise, at the mean life expectancy (59.7 years)
the aid coe¢ cient is 0.738 and at the maximum life expectancy (77.5 years) the coe¢ cient is 0.932.
These coe¢ cients should not be interpreted literally since the coe¢ cient on the interaction term only
captures the slope of the interaction at the mean, not at the extremes of either variable. But they
are indicative that 1) short-impact aid is more e⁄ective where health conditions are better, and 2)
short-impact aid is e⁄ective to some degree throughout the entire range of health conditions￿ which
is why the aid e⁄ect is easily observed even without an interaction term. It is appropriate to recall
at this point that nearly all aid with a direct impact on health conditions is not included in the
￿short-impact￿aid measure and is instead classi￿ed as ￿long-impact.￿
Columns 7 through 10 suggest that there may indeed be some heterogeneity in the e⁄ect of
short-impact aid according to the quality of institutions in the recipient country, though there is
no such di⁄erence according to the index of in￿ ation, budget, and ￿openness￿policies popularized
by Burnside and Dollar. This may help explain why Burnside and Dollar (2004) abandon the
earlier policy interaction term from Burnside and Dollar (2000) questioned by Easterly, Levine and
Roodman in favor of an interaction with institutional quality, though they continue to refer to the
latter as ￿policies and institutions.￿In column 7 we see that very little changes when in￿ uential
observations in interaction-growth space are removed from Table 11 column 7, but the more e¢ cient
GMM estimate suggests that the interaction e⁄ect may not be entirely spurious.21 It is not, however,
signi￿cant at the 5% level, so we cannot be con￿dent in taking the coe¢ cient estimate at face value.
Again, our ￿ndings on the heterogeneous e⁄ect of short-impact aid agree with what Burnside and
Dollar (2004) ￿nd for aggregate aid: that aid may indeed work better to some degree in countries that
e⁄ectively battle corruption, guard property rights, and cultivate a respect for law. But￿ and this is
a key di⁄erence￿ we ￿nd that when aid is measured in a way commensurate with the very brief period
of observation, exploiting this heterogeneity is not at all necessary to detect in macroeconomic data
the very large impact of aid on growth. Aid does not work equally well everywhere, but measured
correctly it works well even in relatively poor institutional environments.
6.2 How large is the e⁄ect?
The marginal e⁄ect of short-impact aid on growth is much larger than the e⁄ect of aggregate aid.
In Table 5, for example, we can reject at the 5% level the hypothesis that the coe¢ cient estimate
on short-impact aid in column 4 is equal to the coe¢ cient on aggregate gross aid in column 1. Our
21In this case the Pagan-Hall test fails to reject the hypothesis of homoskedastic errors (￿2
30 = 36:7, p-value =
0.187).
31coe¢ cient estimate on aggregate aid is of an order of magnitude comparable to most estimates of the
e⁄ect of aggregate aid in the ￿ unconditional￿literature. Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), Lensink and
White (2001), Gomanee et al. (2002, 2003), Moreira (2003), and Roodman (2003) all ￿nd positive,
signi￿cant coe¢ cients on the linear aid term on the order of 0.1-0.4.22 Our estimate of the marginal
e⁄ect of short-impact aid at zero thus exceeds all typical estimates of the growth e⁄ect of aggregate
aid.
Turning now to the average e⁄ect of aid, Table 13 examines the contribution of each right-hand
side variable (including aid) to the di⁄erences in growth rates across regions. To be conservative, we
use the estimated coe¢ cients for the OLS regressions using short-impact aid lagged (Table 8, column
1), since that was the smallest of all our estimated coe¢ cients on short impact aid and because the
2SLS estimate may be slightly biased upwards. The table makes it clear that 1) our model does
a good job of explaining interregional growth di⁄erences and 2) the contribution of di⁄erences in
aid levels to di⁄erences in growth is substantial. The ￿rst column contains the coe¢ cient estimates
from Table 8 column 1, and the second column contains the implied growth elasticities of each at
the regressor mean. The elasticity of growth with respect to aid is high compared to many of the
other controls.
The center section of the table contains the regressor mean values disaggregated by region. The
rightmost section of the table then multiplies the regression coe¢ cient by the di⁄erence between
the regional average regressor value and the world average regressor value. The result is the degree
of di⁄erence between regional growth and world average growth explained by the fact that the
regional average value of that regressor di⁄ers from the world average value. The entire column is
summed to reach the ￿average growth di⁄erence explained￿row, which shows the total di⁄erence
between regional growth and world average growth explained by regional characteristics included
in the model. Immediately below that is the true di⁄erence between regional average growth and
world average growth. Note that in the case of East Asia, the predicted growth di⁄erence is by
construction identical to the observed di⁄erence since an East Asia dummy variable is included in
the model.
The subsequent row reveals that the di⁄erence between the two preceding rows is typically small.
In all cases, the model explains a large majority of the di⁄erence between regional average growth
and world average growth. Finally, we note towards the bottom of the table that the contribution of
interregional di⁄erences in aid levels to interregional growth di⁄erences￿ the result of adding the top
22Exceptionally, Dalgaard et al. (2004) ￿nd a coe¢ cient on linear aggregate net aid of 1.35.
32two numbers in each row. The estimates indicate that Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East/North
Africa grew substantially more than they otherwise would have because they received more aid than
average, and that the remaining regions grew less than they otherwise would have because they
received less than average aid.
Instead of our core speci￿cation estimates we conservatively use the aid coe¢ cient estimates from
Table 8 column 1, which eliminate any bias to the Table 4 estimates from improperly including the
longer-term e⁄ects of short-impact aid, as discussed above. These coe¢ cients suggest, for example,
that while average growth in Sub-Saharan Africa was ￿ 0.23%, it would have been 0.57% lower, or
￿ 0.80%, had the region received world average short-impact aid ￿ ows (2.70% of GDP) instead of
the amount it actually received (5.33%). Conservatively, then, aid raised average annual per capita
income growth in Sub-Saharan Africa by half a percentage point or more between 1973 and 2001.
That is, while Africa￿ s growth performance has been disappointing, it would have been much worse
in the absence of aid. Here, as elsewhere, we take no account whatsoever of any additional impact
on long-run growth due to long-impact aid. Half a percentage point is thus a very conservative
estimate of the total impact of aid on growth in Africa.
These ￿gures make it clear why a well-performing growth model controlling for the confounding
growth e⁄ects of other forces is essential to detect the e⁄ect of aid on growth. As van de Walle
(1999) notes, ￿[S]ince 1980, the donors have collectively spent some US $200 billion in Africa. ...
Yet, Africa￿ s economic performance remains mediocre.￿But this by itself does not mean that aid
did not help growth. All else equal, aid did help growth￿ Africa￿ s growth performance would have
been far worse without it.
The coe¢ cient estimate for repayments on aid is also of some interest. In Tables 4 and 9 and
elsewhere, repayments have a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on growth. This suggests that countries
receiving gross aid ￿ ows would, all else equal, grow more if they did not have to repay loans. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, average repayments are 0.36% of GDP in the sample (whose natural
logarithm, shown in the table, is ￿ 1.03), above the average of 0.18% for all aid recipients. The right-
most column of Table 13 suggests that these repayments cost the average country in Sub-Saharan
Africa a ￿fth of a percentage point in annual growth during 1973-2001. In other words, income per
capita in the region today might be roughly 5.8% higher if aid ￿ ows had been exclusively grants.
336.3 Absorptive Capacity and the Economic returns to aid
The coe¢ cient estimates from our core regression also contain information about average capacity
for a recipient country to productively absorb short-impact aid, with implications for the economic
returns to aid. The conservative coe¢ cient estimates in column 1 of Table 8 suggest a parabolic
or ￿ inverted-U￿e⁄ect of short-impact aid, of the type commonly seen for aggregate aid. The global
maximum of this average e⁄ect occurs when short-impact aid represents 8.8% of GDP. It is worth
reinforcing that these ￿gures include only short-impact aid, which averages about 53% of total aid.
Thus, the global maximum (short-impact aid of 8.8%) typically occurs when aggregate aid is around
17% of GDP. This does not mean, of course, that more than 17% of GDP in aggregate aid cannot
raise growth in a given recipient; some can absorb more, some less.
The shape of this parabola has direct implications for the expected economic returns to aid for a
given recipient. Again using the conservative coe¢ cient estimates of Table 8 column 1, the average
value of short-impact aid in the dataset is 2.70% of GDP and is associated with a 1.11% increase
in growth relative to zero aid
￿





. Likewise, 3.70% of GDP in
short-impact aid causes 1.41% growth, so at the mean an additional 1% of GDP in short-impact
aid produces an additional 0.31 percentage points in average annual growth. At face value, this
may seem ine¢ cient, as $1 dollar in aid brings an immediate increase in output of $0.31. But
this is not the whole story, just as it is not the complete story when a private ￿rm invests $1 and
gets an increase in output of less than $1 in the ￿rst year. We need to explore the increment in
output over time associated with an additional $1 in aid. To do so, let ￿ represent the sum of the
rate of time preference and the depreciation rate, and let g be the growth e⁄ect of a one-period











￿. When g = 0.31%, the economy-wide internal
rate of return to short-impact aid (the value of ￿ at which the bene￿t stream equals exactly 1% of
GDP in present value) is thus 42.1%. Thus, short-impact aid causes an expansion of GDP larger
than the aid ￿ ow itself so long as the sum of the discount rate and the depreciation rate is less than
42.1%￿ a high threshold. Letting ￿ = 35%, at the mean a $1 dollar in￿ ow of short-impact aid leads
to a cumulative increase in economic output (and income) of roughly $1.64 in net present value.
This is the economy-wide return, which will naturally exceed any project-level rate of return due
to Keynes￿multiplier. Assuming a marginal propensity to consume of 0.8, and thus a multiplier
of 5, this suggests that project-level rates of return for aid are typically 12.9%. The plausibility of
this value is suggested by internal evaluations at the World Bank claiming a 17% rate of return on
typical projects (Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett 1997, p. 239).
34What evidence do we have that the e⁄ect of aid persists beyond the current period? In the 2SLS
regressions of Table 5 and in corresponding unreported OLS results, lagged aid is never negatively
correlated with current growth. If it were the case that current aid is only positively associated with
current growth, and has no e⁄ect on growth lasting beyong the current period, then all else equal
an impulse current aid should result in a rise in current growth and a precisely corresponding drop
in growth in the following period￿ which is to say that lagged aid should be negatively correlated
with growth. But this is not at all the case, suggesting that indeed the e⁄ects of ￿short-impact￿aid
last beyond the current period.
Regarding the implied turning point in our estimates, we caution strongly against over-interpreting
the results to imply that short-impact aid greater than 8.8% of GDP will begin to have a negative
marginal impact on growth. Once we control for the in￿ uence of our other independent variables,
there are no observations in the partial relationship between aid and growth in which short-impact
aid exceeds 8.8% of GDP. All of our observations are in the upward-sloping portion of the curve.
Indeed, we achieve almost the same results using the log of short-impact aid as we do with the
quadratic speci￿cation. Our results show strong evidence for diminishing returns, but not necessar-
ily of negative returns.
7 Links to the recent empirical literature
The next two tables explore the relationship between our core ￿ndings and two of the most prominent
recent aid-growth papers. In brief, we ￿nd that there is no ￿macro-micro paradox.￿When aid is
properly de￿ned as aid that is capable of producing a growth e⁄ect within the period of observation,
aid￿ s e⁄ect on growth is easily detectable in cross-country analysis. This ￿nding questions the
premise upon which the ￿conditional￿literature was built￿ that macroeconomic analysis could only
reliably detect a growth impact of aid in countries with certain characteristics, but not in the full
sample of LDCs. It thus supports the thrust of the ￿unconditional￿strand of the literature, but
extends that literature by ￿nding a much larger e⁄ect of aid on growth when aid relevant to the
observation period is used.
Table 14 demonstrates this reasoning by dissecting the di⁄erence between our results and those
of Burnside and Dollar (2000), the ￿ agship of the ￿conditional￿strand of the recent literature. We
begin by reproducing their core result (column 1): aid interacted with the policy measure is positive
and signi￿cant, but aid alone is not (even when the interaction term is not included). We then
expand their dataset to that of Roodman (2003) in column 2, which extends to 2001 and includes
Eastern Europe, and add a squared aid term (col. 3). As in Roodman (2003) and Easterly, Levine
35and Roodman (2004), with this larger sample the Burnside an Dollar results disappear, and both
aid and the interaction term are insigni￿cant.
Burnside and Dollar use a measure of aid that is relatively rare in the literature: ￿E⁄ective￿
Development Assistance (EDA) divided by GDP measured at purchasing power parity (PPP). The
numerator is a measure of the net present value of aid ￿ ows taken from Chang et al. (1999), and
the denominator from the Penn World Table. Both of these choices are subject to question. While
o¢ cial development assistance (ODA, the standard de￿nition of aid as provided by the OECD)
captures only current aid ￿ ows, EDA captures the net present value of future ￿ ows. But is the fact
that a road is built with a loan that must be repaid decades into the future relevant to the capacity
of that road to produce growth within a four-year period? In a Ricardian world of perfect foresight
and perfect credit markets, yes; but such a model is simply irrelevant to how most LDC consumers
using the road make decisions. We strongly prefer, along with the large majority of aid-growth
studies, to measure aid as ODA. Indeed, in their most recent paper, Burnside and Dollar (2004)
themselves switch from EDA to ODA, presumably for these very reasons. Switching from EDA to
short-impact gross ODA (col. 4) causes the coe¢ cient on aid to swing from negative to positive and
large, though still statistically insigni￿cant.
The Burnside and Dollar denominator of PPP GDP, also rare in the aid-growth literature, is
likewise open to question. It can be justi￿ed theoretically under the assumption that most aid is
spent on goods and services with nontradable local substitutes. Suppose for example that an aid
project in Ethiopia purchases a bulldozer that does the work of ￿fty local laborers. This allows
those laborers to do something else, and the gain to the economy is proportional to the value of the
bulldozer￿ s services in local terms￿ that is, at PPP. If on the other hand aid is spent on tradable
items with no locally-available substitute￿ a vaccine, for example￿ then the gain to the recipient
economy is simply that of not having to purchase those items for itself on the international market.
This would have to be done by ￿rst purchasing dollars, meaning that the value of the aid relative to
the whole economy must be computed using GDP at exchange rates. It is not immediately obvious
which of these is more ￿tting for most aid projects, and at the very least we must test the sensitivity
of any result to di⁄erent choices of denominator. Table 14 reveals that Burnside and Dollar￿ s choice
was not innocuous. When we use GDP at exchange rates instead of the PPP GDP denominator in
column 5, the aid coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant.
We note two characteristics of the Burnside and Dollar speci￿cation: 1) instrumentation for aid
and aid squared is frequently weak, with a particularly low Shea (1997) ￿rst-stage R2 in column
5, and 2) growth is not well-modeled, in that most of their non-aid regressors have statistically
36insigni￿cant growth e⁄ects. In column 6 and thereafter we return to our preferred growth model
from Table 4. Columns 6 shows that, with growth better modeled by relevant covariates, even the
coe¢ cient on EDA is positive (though not signi￿cant). When aid is instead measured as net ODA
(col. 7) as a fraction of exchange-rate GDP (col. 8) or gross ODA (col. 9), its growth e⁄ect is
positive and signi￿cant. Finally, when we switch to short-impact aid, the e⁄ect is much larger (col.
10) and only increases when we use PPP GDP as our denominator (col. 11). The ￿nal column
removes four outliers to correspond to column 5 of Table 4.
In short, Burnside and Dollar￿ s ￿nding that aid does not a⁄ect growth in the absence of a policy
interaction term vanishes when aid relevant to a four-year observation horizon, short-impact aid,
is considered￿ even using their weak speci￿cation of the growth model (col. 5). With a stronger
speci￿cation (col. 10 and 11) this result is not sensitive to their questionable choice of denominator.
Table 15 turns to the results of Hansen and Tarp (2000), perhaps the taproot of the ￿uncondi-
tional￿strand of the recent aid-growth literature. We begin by reproducing their core result, that
aggregate net ODA has a positive, signi￿cant, nonlinear impact on growth in the absence of any
interaction term (col. 1). We then expand the sample to Roodman￿ s (2003) dataset (col. 2) and
use clustered standard errors to correct for ￿rst-order autocorrelated errors we detect (col. 3). We
then switch to gross short-impact aid while retaining the rest of their speci￿cation (col. 4), and the
coe¢ cient on aid increases greatly. The same thing happens (col. 5 and 6) when we employ our
preferred speci￿cation from Table 4.
Hansen and Tarp￿ s result, then, is correct in spirit; it demonstrates that when properly-measured
aid is allowed a nonlinear e⁄ect on growth, the ￿micro-macro paradox￿disappears. But they un-
derstate the growth impact of aid by considering aggregate ODA with an observation period of only
four years. The growth e⁄ect of that portion of aid capable of a⁄ecting growth in so short a time is
much larger.
8 Broad policy implications
The chronic aid-growth debate has always been much more than a scholarly discussion. Its various
results frequently have been interpreted as having direct implications for aid policy, even by those
that did not conduct empirical research on the topic. For example, Milton Friedman (1958) draws
upon anecdotes of waste and lack of growth impact from aid to argue that American foreign aid
should be immediately and permanently canceled. Similarly, based largely on the evidence of Mosley
37(1980) and Mosley et al. (1987),23 Keith Gri¢ n (1991) argues that the economic bene￿ts of aid have
been ￿at best negligible￿and thus foreign aid for the purpose of promoting economic development
￿urgently needs to be reconsidered.￿
PØter Bauer regularly made qualitative, anecdotal arguments in favor of the elimination of foreign
aid. Bauer (1966, p. 32) argues that aid ￿has not served to bring about an appreciable rise in
living standards in under-developed countries.￿Aid requires a ￿drastic readjustment￿and must be
allocated ￿much more selectively both politically and geographically.￿Even if it were more selective,
however, Bauer (1971, p. 135) adds that aid ￿is unlikely to be a major instrument ... for the
material progress of poor countries.￿Aid often reinforces the centralized power of corrupt or inept
regimes, he claims, in addition to ￿nancing more consumption than investment, crowding out private
investment, and distracting attention from more fundamental determinants of growth. Decades
later, Bauer (1991, p. 53) remains convinced that ￿external donations can do little or nothing for
development,￿though he refers to none of the empirical economics literature on the subject. Bauer
(2000, p. 51) at last articulates the logical policy conclusion of his lifelong argument: that ￿o¢ cial
government-to-government subsidies ought to be terminated or at least drastically curtailed.￿
By the late 1990s, van de Walle (1999) reports that ￿policy elites ... are more skeptical about aid
than ever before￿in part because of ￿the surprisingly strong consensus that most aid in the past has
been ine⁄ective.￿In fact, ￿[a]id to Africa is less threatened by the current foreign policy and ￿scal
pressures than by a complex crisis of legitimacy regarding the enterprise. Despite o¢ cial rhetoric to
the contrary, most aid insiders are disappointed by the current achievements of aid.￿
The World Bank has counterattacked over the last six years, asserting that aid can work when
done right. ￿The evidence on the e⁄ectiveness of aid has at times been ambiguous￿ but this is
because early research failed to distinguish between di⁄erent types of aid and recipients￿(World
Bank 2002, p. 93). Studies launched primarily by investigators associated with the Bank have
had enormous policy in￿ uence (as reviewed earlier in this paper and in Roodman 2003). In both
academic and policy circles it is today often taken on faith that aid works best in countries with
good policies and strong institutions, with the implication that more aid should be allocated to these
countries. In the strongest version of this argument, some believe that aid only works in countries
with strong policies and institutions, and should be signi￿cantly curtailed or halted in countries with
weak institutions.
23Regarding the e⁄ect of aid on growth, Gri¢ n also cites the 3SLS regressions of Gupta and Islam (1983), which
reject the hypothesis that the growth e⁄ect of aid was zero or negative in the 1960s and 1970s. He writes o⁄ this
evidence as meaning only that ￿many outcomes are possible￿and highlights the authors￿conclusion that aid does not
o⁄er ￿the solution￿for rapid growth. This is, of course, very di⁄erent from stating that aid does not a⁄ect growth.
Gri¢ n also cites work on aid￿ s e⁄ect of on non-growth outcomes.
38The key point is that the World Bank￿ s response to the critics of aid explained the ￿ambiguous￿
relationship between aid and growth primarily by heterogeneity among aid recipients. Our results
suggest that heterogeneity of recipients plays a role, but is not the primary reason why growth
e⁄ects of aid have been di¢ cult to detect. Instead, we ￿nd that the heterogeneity in aid ￿ows is the
key reason for the mixed earlier results. Matching aid ￿ ows to the observation period over which
they might reasonably a⁄ect growth makes the relationship easy to detect. Many of the policy
implications taken from ￿ conditional￿literature like the work of Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004)
have thus been based on incomplete information. The typical experience of developing countries is
that the types of aid that should be expected to cause growth over a four-year period do, in fact,
cause growth. This changes the policy conclusions: aid does not need to be restricted to a handful
of recipients with the strongest institutions in order for the aid portfolio as a whole to have positive
returns. The evidence presented here does suggest that short-impact aid may have a slightly larger
impact on growth in countries with strong institutions, but it has a large and positive impact on
growth even in countries with weak institutions.
This result does not mean that aid is always bene￿cial everywhere. Bauer was right that aid in
the wrong circumstances can help centralize the power of autocratic despots, as it did for Joseph
Mobutu and Ferdinand Marcos. In addition, aid is subject to diminishing returns, so ever-larger
increments of aid can lead to weaker (and possibly negative) returns because of absorptive capacity
issues in some countries. Moreover, our results show that aid does not work equally in all countries
to produce growth: some countries have a stronger aid-growth relationship, while others have a
weaker one, as Tables 11 and 12 con￿rm and the scatterplots of Figure 2 illustrate. The big story,
however, is that donors￿collective, overall aid portfolio has had positive returns. Although some aid
certainly has been wasted and aid quality could be much improved (including through a reallocation
of aid to certain countries where it is likely to be more productive), overall positive returns to the
aid portfolio do not depend upon dropping large numbers of recipients from the rolls.
9 Conclusions
Most research on foreign aid and economic growth has mistakenly tried to ￿nd the relationship
between total aid ￿ ows and growth over a relatively short period￿ typically four years￿ when signif-
icant portions of aid cannot be expected to have this kind of impact. All foreign aid is not the same.
By focusing on aid ￿ ows that might reasonably be expected to stimulate growth in four years ￿such
as balance of payments support, investments in infrastructure, and support for productive sectors
such as agriculture and industry￿ we ￿nd a very strong, positive, and robust relationship in which
39￿short-impact￿aid causes growth. The result is robust over a wide variety of speci￿cations. It holds
(with only modest changes in the estimated coe¢ cients) when we control for no other right-hand
side variables or when we control for any or all of ten or more commonly-used right hand side vari-
ables that might a⁄ect growth. It holds over various time periods, stands up whether we include or
exclude in￿ uential observations, and remains robust when controlling for the possible endogeneity
of several independent variables.
Even in our most conservative results (shown in Table 8, column 1), the impact of short-impact
aid on growth is substantial. At the mean (where short-impact aid is about 2.70% of GDP), we
￿nd that an additional one percentage point of GDP in short-impact aid produces an additional
0.31 percentage points of annual growth over the four year period. Since the increment in GDP
will be maintained to some degree over time, with plausible assumptions we ￿nd a high payo⁄ for
short-impact aid, with $1 in aid leading to a gross economy-wide return of $1.64 in net present value.
Assuming conservatively that the depreciation and discount rates sum to 35%, and the marginal
propensity to consume is 0.8, this corresponds to a project-level rate of return of roughly 13%. From
a di⁄erent perspective, we ￿nd that higher-than-average short-impact aid to sub-Saharan Africa
raised per capita growth rates there by about half a percentage point over the growth that would
have been achieved by average aid ￿ ows.
We ￿nd a non-linear relationship between short-impact aid and growth in which the impact of
aid on growth is subject to diminishing returns. This suggests some limits on the ability of typical
recipient countries to absorb very large amounts of short-impact aid. However, the turning point
is well above the amount of aid that most countries receive. Whereas the average country receives
short-impact aid ￿ ows of about 2.70% of GDP, our estimates indicate that the maximum growth
e⁄ect occurs when short-impact aid represents 8%￿ 9% of GDP. Thereafter, we cannot distinguish
further positive marginal returns to aid. After controlling for the impact of other variables, we
￿nd strong evidence for diminishing returns, but not necessarily negative returns beyond this point.
Note that since short-impact aid represents about 53% of total aid on average, the maximum for
short-impact aid occurs when total aid reaches around 15%￿ 18% of GDP in the typical country.
This does not mean that in any particular country, aggregate aid ￿ ows greater than 18% of GDP are
necessarily a bad idea. Instead, this represents the typical pattern over the last 30 years. Absorptive
capacity can change over time, and some countries undoubtedly can absorb more aid ￿ ows than
others. Indeed, we ￿nd in the presence of strong institutions and good health the turning point
occurs at a larger amount of aid.
We ￿nd strong evidence of a fairly robust relationship between other variables and economic
40growth in low-income countries. All else being equal, stronger institutions, more open trade, lower
in￿ ation, and lower budget de￿cits are associated with faster economic growth. In addition, countries
that are located outside of the tropics, that have higher life expectancies, and are not experiencing
civil con￿ ict also have achieved faster growth. We also ￿nd a negative and statistically signi￿-
cant relationship between debt repayments and growth￿ controlling for other variables, the larger a
country￿ s debt service payments, the slower its economic growth.
Our ￿nding that ￿short-impact￿aid has a strong and statistically signi￿cant relationship with
growth does not mean that this category of aid ￿works￿everywhere and all the time. As with any
statistical relationship, there are points above the line (where a given amount of aid is associated
with even higher than average growth) and points below the line (where abundant aid has not been
associated with growth). Rather, our results indicate that for the average (and above average)
country short-impact aid clearly has stimulated growth, but the relationship does not hold in all
countries. We further explore this heterogeneity in the relationship by examining whether the
aid-growth relationship is stronger or weaker in countries with particular characteristics￿ such as
those with better policies, and stronger institutions. We ￿nd modest evidence that the aid-growth
relationship has greater force in countries with stronger institutions as well as for those with higher
life expectancy (i.e., better health). Thus, short-impact aid does seem to be somewhat more powerful
in countries with healthier populations and strong institutions. However, unlike some previous
research we do not ￿nd that a positive aid-growth relationship depends on strong institutions.
Rather, we ￿nd a substantial positive relationship even in countries with weak institutions, and a
slightly more powerful one in countries with more capable institutions.
The short-impact aid-growth relationship does not vary across countries to a statistically signif-
icant degree according to other characteristics like their di⁄erent policies, levels of income, or other
attributes. As mentioned we ￿nd strong evidence that policies (trade, in￿ ation, budget) matter for
growth, and play an important role in distinguishing rapidly growing from slowly growing economies.
But we ￿nd that the distinction between good and poor policy is not necessary to ￿nd a positive
relationship between ￿short-impact￿aid and growth.
Emphatically our results also do not mean that social-sector investments (or ￿long-impact￿aid)
or humanitarian aid have no long-run growth e⁄ect. We consciously, deliberately ignore those
e⁄ects￿ whatever they may be￿ in order to more accurately measure the short-run growth e⁄ects of
short-impact aid alone. We note that the results in Table 5 do suggest an important long-run positive
impact on growth from long-impact aid, but this study does not intend or attempt to quantify it.
We leave that to future research. Here, we quantify the growth impact of only one portion of
41aggregate aid ￿ ows. Any growth e⁄ects accruing in the long run from social sector investments must
be considered over and above the growth e⁄ects we quantify in this study.
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47Short-impact Long-impact Humanitarian
CRS three digit and sample 5 digit codes
110   Education 14,939 6.6 3.9 96.1 0.0
120   Health 10,427 4.6 3.9 96.1 0.0
130   Population Policies/Programmes and Reproductive Health 4,927 2.2 3.0 97.0 0.0
140   Water Supply and Sanitation 15,364 6.8 2.3 97.7 0.0
150   Government and Civil Society 15,887 7.0 13.0 87.0 0.0
160   Other Social Infrastructure and Services 11,530 5.1 16.0 84.0 0.0
210   Transport and Storage 27,423 12.1 91.0 9.0 0.0
220   Communications 1,780 0.8 65.8 34.2 0.0
  22000 Unclassified 0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
  22010 Communications policy and administrative management 165 0.1 0.2 99.8 0.0
  22020 Telecommunications 1,196 0.5 97.6 2.4 0.0
  22030 Radio/television/print media 418 0.2 0.5 99.5 0.0
230   Energy Generation and Supply 15,230 6.7 78.1 21.9 0.0
240   Banking and Financial Services 3,534 1.6 59.0 41.0 0.0
250   Business and Other Services 5,339 2.4 62.9 37.1 0.0
311   Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 16,952 7.5 66.1 33.9 0.0
321   Industry, Mineral Resources and Mining and Construction 4,186 1.8 78.0 22.0 0.0
331   Trade and tourism 888 0.4 33.0 67.0 0.0
400   Multisector/Cross-Cutting 39 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
410   General Environmental Protection 5,308 2.3 10.6 89.4 0.0
420   Women In Development 258 0.1 14.2 85.8 0.0
430   Other Multisector 12,447 5.5 7.2 92.8 0.0
510   Structural Adjustment Assistance With World Bank/IMF 6,145 2.7 100.0 0.0 0.0
520   Developmental Food Aid/Food Security Assistance 7,422 3.3 0.0 0.0 100.0
530   Other General Programme and Commodity Assistance 12,717 5.6 100.0 0.0 0.0
600   Action Relating to Debt 17,369 7.7 100.0 0.0 0.0
700   Emergency Assistance 392 0.2 0.0 0.0 100.0
710   Emergency Food Aid 1,819 0.8 0.0 0.0 100.0
720   Other Emergency and Distress Relief 9,590 4.2 0.0 0.0 100.0
910   Administrative Costs of Donors 256 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
920   Support to Non-Governmental Organisations 85 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
998   Unallocated/ Unspecified 2,520 1.1 1.2 98.5 0.0
Total in USD 226,550 102,523 104,546 19,217
  (percent of total) 100.0 45.3 46.1 8.5
Note: Aid is classified into short-impact, long-impact and humanitarian categories using CRS purpose codes and "purpose prefixes". The former are 
summarized at the three-digit level, above and are detailed at the full, five-digit level in the appendix. 
Table 1. Overview of aid classification
Commitments, 
1997-01 in $
In percent of 
total (In percent of category total)
(See Appendix Table 1 for a more detailed disaggregation)
47Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Data points for which we have actual disaggregated disbursements (1990 onwards)
Net ODA 694 6.18 8.27 -0.45 58.60
Gross ODA 694 7.19 9.18 0.02 74.97
Estimated short-impact, definition 1 694 3.39 4.78 0.00 35.49
Estimated long-impact, definition 1 694 3.39 4.91 0.00 52.13
Estimated humanitarian, definition 1 694 0.41 1.09 0.00 17.61
Actual short-impact, definition 1 694 3.91 6.11 0.00 58.11
Actual long-impact, definition 1 694 2.72 4.27 0.00 34.12
Actual humanitarian, definition 1 694 0.53 1.64 0.00 15.89
Estimated short-impact, definition 2 694 3.37 4.76 0.00 35.18
Estimated long-impact, definition 2 694 3.41 4.89 0.00 51.90
Estimated humanitarian, definition 2 694 0.41 1.08 0.00 17.26
All data
Net ODA 3,526 8.79 13.50 -0.55 241.78
Gross ODA 3,528 9.40 13.91 0.00 241.78
Estimated short-impact, definition 1 3,528 4.75 9.06 0.00 232.51
Estimated long-impact, definition 1 3,528 3.79 6.31 0.00 70.51
Estimated humanitarian, definition 1 3,528 0.86 3.40 0.00 92.20
Estimated short-impact, definition 2 3,528 4.69 8.98 0.00 232.51
Estimated long-impact, definition 2 3,528 3.86 6.39 0.00 70.72
Estimated humanitarian, definition 2 3,528 0.86 3.39 0.00 92.20
Table 2. Summary statistics for aid variables
(In percent of GDP)
Note: Definition 1 estimates of aid are constructed by classifying real sector flows as short-impact aid and 
social sector flows as long-impact aid. These estimates are compared to actual 1990s data compiled on a 
definition 1 basis. Definition 2 estimates of aid modify definition 1 so that budget support is classified as 
short-impact aid and technical cooperation is classified as long-impact aid, regardless of sector. Definition 
2 is our preferred estimate and is used in the regression analysis. For details see text.



























Gross ODA 0.987 1.000
Short-impact estimate, definition 1 0.883 0.894 1.000
Long-impact estimate, definition 1 0.880 0.896 0.622 1.000
Humanitarian estimate, definition 1 0.468 0.464 0.337 0.314 1.000
Actual short-impact, definition 1 0.868 0.888 0.852 0.755 0.333 1.000
Actual long-impact, definition 1 0.753 0.750 0.581 0.778 0.261 0.408 1.000
Actual humanitarian, definition 1 0.310 0.322 0.306 0.159 0.647 0.170 0.059 1.000
Short-impact estimate, definition 2 0.885 0.897 0.996 0.632 0.333 0.851 0.593 0.298 1.000
Long-impact estimate, definition 2 0.886 0.900 0.632 0.996 0.322 0.763 0.772 0.170 0.635 1.000
Humanitarian estimate, definition 2 0.469 0.465 0.338 0.316 1.000 0.334 0.262 0.648 0.335 0.323 1.000
Note: All correlations, except actual humanitarian versus actual long, are significant at the 1% level. 
Table 3. Simple correlations between estimates and actual values of of aid using data from the 1990s
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Net ODA squared -0.00763
(0.00457)*
Short-impact aid 0.620 0.524 0.684 0.960 0.930
(0.241)** (0.232)** (0.195)*** (0.328)*** (0.251)***
Short-impact aid squared -0.0408 -0.0331 -0.0408 -0.0588 -0.0507
(0.0159)** (0.0141)** (0.0120)*** (0.0264)** (0.0190)***
Log repayments -0.170 -0.204 -0.384 -0.508
(0.199) (0.180) (0.188)** (0.159)***
Log initial GDP per capita 1.55 1.78 0.747 0.217 -0.0593 -0.253
(0.522)*** (0.501)*** (0.379)** (0.446) (0.493) (0.439)
East Asia 1.94 2.35 2.39 2.62
(0.794)** (0.639)*** (0.648)*** (0.601)***
Institutional quality 0.370 0.315 0.333 0.323
(0.136)*** (0.105)*** (0.114)*** (0.106)***
Inflation -2.01 -1.71 -1.60 -1.30
(0.452)*** (0.513)*** (0.558)*** (0.403)***
Budget balance 3.25 6.42 8.28 6.22
(6.29) (6.18) (5.47) (4.24)
Openness Sachs-Warner 1.19 1.17 1.41 1.47
(0.517)** (0.438)*** (0.456)*** (0.388)***
Tropics -1.86 -2.13 -2.28
(0.393)*** (0.398)*** (0.290)***
Log initial life expectancy 2.24 3.49 4.06
(1.75) (1.85)* (1.54)***
Civil war -2.39 -2.19 -1.82
(0.888)*** (0.891)** (0.813)**
Lagged civil war 2.03 1.86 1.56
(0.703)*** (0.730)** (0.644)**
Observations 372 372 372 372 368 368
R-squared 0.117 0.105 0.296 0.375 0.388 0.383
Hansen J stat of over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.008 0.011 0.347 0.450 0.773 0.773
Shea partial R-squared for aid 0.607 0.549 0.492 0.491 0.314 0.314
Shea partial R-squared for aid squared 0.593 0.509 0.468 0.471 0.257 0.257
Shea partial R-squared for log repayments 0.578 0.576 0.537 0.537
Influential observations removed using Hadi procedure NNNNYY
Table 4. Core results
Note: Dependent variable is four-year average GDP per capita growth.  Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include period dummies and a constant term. Aid, aid squared and repayments are 
instrumented. For all regressions, F-tests for the hypothesis that the instruments are not relevant are rejected at the 1 percent level. For details see 
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Figure 2. Partial scatters for core regressions 
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Short-impact aid squared in percent of GDP
Short-impact aid squared-growth partial scatter
Note: Each country is denoted by its 3-letter ISO country code and a period code, where period 1 is 1974-77, and so on in 4-year periods.  12345
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Gross aid 0.232
(0.091)**
Gross aid squared -0.00522
(0.00275)*
Short-impact aid 0.793 0.801 0.960 0.583
(0.413)* (0.291)*** (0.328)*** (0.241)**
Short-impact aid squared -0.0556 -0.0503 -0.0588 -0.0326
(0.0285)* (0.0219)** (0.0264)** (0.0144)**
Long-impact aid 0.146
(0.266)
Long-impact aid squared 0.0000762
(0.012)
Humanitarian aid -0.407 -0.0412
(1.29) (1.16)
Humanitarian aid squared 0.146 0.0973
(0.317) (0.282)
Twice lagged short-impact aid 0.172
(0.206)
Twice lagged short-impact aid squared -0.0184
(0.0135)
Twice lagged long-impact aid 0.0429
(0.171)
Twice lagged long-impact aid squared 0.00253
(0.00645)
Log repayments -0.256 -0.404 -0.309 -0.384 -0.579
(0.166) (0.189)** (0.178)* (0.188)** (0.214)***
Log initial GDP per capita -0.308 0.0223 -0.146 -0.0593 -0.719
(0.419) (0.496) (0.479) (0.493) (0.504)
East Asia 2.23 2.33 2.31 2.39 2.38
(0.616)*** (0.635)*** (0.637)*** (0.648)*** (0.643)***
Tropics -2.05 -2.23 -2.00 -2.13 -2.18
(0.359)*** (0.423)*** (0.419)*** (0.398)*** (0.418)***
Log initial life expectancy 3.76 3.12 4.06 3.49 3.41
(1.67)** (2.12) (1.96)** (1.85)* (1.82)*
Civil war -1.81 -1.75 -2.29 -2.19 -1.23
(0.727)** (0.767)** (0.882)*** (0.891)** (0.757)
Lagged civil war 1.66 1.27 1.65 1.86 1.36
(0.495)*** (0.617)** (0.714)** (0.730)** (0.560)**
Institutional quality 0.331 0.299 0.331 0.333 0.525
(0.104)*** (0.121)** (0.121)*** (0.114)*** (0.118)***
Inflation -1.92 -1.83 -1.67 -1.60 -1.70
(0.539)*** (0.530)*** (0.538)*** (0.558)*** (0.555)***
Budget balance 7.97 6.90 8.74 8.28 6.54
(5.36) (5.18) (5.34) (5.47) (5.41)
Openness Sachs-Warner 1.32 1.32 1.26 1.41 1.51
(0.423)*** (0.460)*** (0.462)*** (0.456)*** (0.440)***
Observations 367 366 368 368 320
R-squared 0.441 0.398 0.399 0.388 0.402
Hansen J stat of over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.307 0.067 0.486 0.773 0.753
Shea partial R-squared for gross aid 0.598
Shea partial R-squared for short aid 0.252 0.323 0.314 0.431
Shea partial R-squared for long aid 0.370
Shea partial R-squared for humanitarian aid 0.220 0.204
Shea partial R-squared for log repayments 0.585 0.532 0.536 0.537 0.539
Table 5. A more detailed disaggregation
Note: Dependent variable is four-year average GDP per capita growth.  Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include period dummies and a constant term. Aid, aid 
squared and repayments are instrumented. For all regressions,  F-tests for the hypothesis that the instruments are not relevant are 
rejected at the 1 percent level. Influential observations in aid-growth space removed using Hadi (1992) procedure. For details see text.
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Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Short-impact aid 1.05 0.958 0.952 0.964 0.841 1.01
(0.329)*** (0.328)*** (0.328)*** (0.331)*** (0.354)** (0.320)***
Short-impact aid squared -0.0664 -0.0583 -0.0583 -0.0587 -0.0489 -0.0602





Log repayments -0.171 -0.340 -0.373 -0.393 -0.283
(0.177) (0.193)* (0.191)* (0.235)* (0.181)
Log initial GDP per capita 0.0143 0.293 -0.133 0.00720 -0.0284 0.802
(0.476) (0.448) (0.492) (0.492) (0.496) (0.554)
East Asia 2.28 2.23 2.29 2.41 2.72 1.79
(0.603)*** (0.452)*** (0.679)*** (0.648)*** (0.673)*** (0.563)***
Tropics -2.08 -2.10 -2.00 -2.04 -2.18 -1.96
(0.384)*** (0.318)*** (0.420)*** (0.460)*** (0.399)*** (0.353)***
Log initial life expectancy 2.60 2.88 2.90 3.33 4.19 2.58
(2.02) (1.75)* (1.74)* (1.72)* (1.65)** (1.79)
Civil war -1.84 -1.69 -2.25 -2.18 -1.91 -1.73
(0.840)** (0.687)** (0.876)** (0.887)** (0.724)*** (0.696)**
Lagged civil war 1.36 1.73 1.88 1.84 1.67 1.37
(0.707)* (0.655)*** (0.730)** (0.727)** (0.604)*** (0.626)**
Institutional quality 0.351 0.270 0.331 0.339 0.296 0.261
(0.111)*** (0.104)*** (0.114)*** (0.113)*** (0.114)*** (0.098)***
Inflation -1.61 -1.99 -1.63 -1.60 -1.66 -1.46
(0.580)*** (0.459)*** (0.567)*** (0.551)*** (0.513)*** (0.493)***
Budget balance 8.31 8.45 8.90 8.53 5.40 8.64
(5.22) (5.29) (5.52) (5.60) (5.57) (5.34)
Openness Sachs-Warner 1.43 1.65 1.32 1.39 1.46 1.58





Secondary school enrollment ratio 0.0129
(0.0123)
Natural resource abundance -0.0082
(0.0173)
Positive commodity shock 1.75
(0.793)**




Lagged natural disaster 1.29
(0.606)**
Observations 367 367 368 368 309 367
R-squared 0.393 0.425 0.392 0.389 0.456 0.414
Hansen J stat of over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.745 0.955 0.744 0.780 0.958 0.688
Table 6. Robustness tests, changing specification
Note: Dependent variable is four-year average GDP per capita growth.  Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include period dummies and a constant term. Aid, aid squared and repayments are instrumented. For 
all regressions, F-tests for the hypothesis that the instruments are not relevant are rejected at the 1 percent level. Influential observations in aid-growth 
space removed using Hadi (1992) procedure. For details see text.
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2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
Dependent variable: ∆ GDP per capita growth
∆ Short-impact aid 1.06 0.678 0.810 0.564
(0.577)* (0.433) (0.465)* (0.298)*
∆ Short-impact aid squared -0.0783 -0.0535 -0.0566 -0.0390
(0.0380)** (0.0265)** (0.0355) (0.0204)*
∆ Log repayments 0.866 1.05 0.768 0.660
(0.711) (0.557)* (0.601) (0.460)
∆ Log initial GDP per capita -5.89 -4.29 -2.67 -1.29
(1.60)*** (1.31)*** (1.77) (1.27)
∆ Log initial life expectancy -3.42 -3.41 -5.98 -4.40
-5.44 -4.38 -4.11 -3.30
∆ Civil war -2.36 -2.58 -2.52 -2.24
(0.916)** (0.782)*** (0.861)*** (0.812)***
∆ Lagged civil war 0.930 1.18 0.766 1.08
(1.05) (0.834) (0.922) (0.717)
∆ Institutional quality 0.279 0.386 0.153 0.276
(0.265) (0.227)* (0.244) (0.212)
∆ Inflation -1.61 -1.06 -1.76 -1.13
(0.705)** (0.392)*** (0.665)*** (0.332)***
∆ Budget balance 4.37 4.70 5.59 6.41
(8.35) (7.49) (8.67) (7.59)
∆ Openness Sachs-Warner 1.65 1.77 1.69 1.97
(0.650)** (0.568)*** (0.640)*** (0.576)***
Observations 295 295 297 297
R-squared 0.165 0.203 0.222 0.227
Hansen J stat of over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.255 0.255 0.511 0.511
Shea partial R-squared for aid 0.145 0.145 0.178 0.178
Shea partial R-squared for aid squared 0.172 0.172 0.189 0.189
Shea partial R-squared for log repayments 0.105 0.105 0.121 0.121
Shea partial R-squared for log inital GDP per capita 0.264 0.264
(Boldface coefficients correspond to instrumented variables)
Table 7. Robustness tests, difference equations
Note: Dependent variable is differenced four-year average GDP per capita growth.  Robust and clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include differenced period dummies.  For 
all regressions, F-tests for the hypothesis that the instruments are not relevant are rejected at the 5 percent level. Influential 
observations in aid-growth space removed using Hadi (1992) procedure. For details see text.
551 2 345
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS GMM
Short-impact aid lagged 0.484 0.598 0.679 0.590 0.525
(0.162)*** (0.165)*** (0.251)*** (0.297)** (0.256)**
Short-impact aid squared lagged -0.0275 -0.0332 -0.0403 -0.0362 -0.0289
(0.0110)** (0.0111)*** (0.0147)*** (0.0202)* (0.0166)*
Long-impact aid lagged 0.000864
(0.163)
Long-impact aid squared lagged -0.00789
(0.00549)
Log repayments lagged -0.307 -0.276 -0.307 -0.244 -0.179
(0.133)** (0.134)** (0.277) (0.316) (0.325)
Log initial GDP per capita -0.370 0.467 -6.34 -10.0 -10.8
(0.351) (0.394) (1.38)*** (4.65)** (4.59)**




Log initial life expectancy 3.23 2.17 -5.66 -2.80 -1.70
(1.41)** (1.47) (7.24) (5.56) (5.18)
Civil war -2.22 -1.61 -2.17 -2.10 -2.26
(0.580)*** (0.582)*** (0.774)*** (0.715)*** (0.818)***
Lagged civil war 1.95 1.47 1.38 0.906 0.645
(0.584)*** (0.577)** (0.748)* (1.14) (1.07)
Institutional quality 0.341 0.316 0.344 0.343 0.334
(0.100)*** (0.104)*** (0.299) (0.226) (0.238)
Inflation -1.97 -1.80 -1.84 -1.91 -2.05
(0.377)*** (0.375)*** (0.567)*** (0.517)*** (0.513)***
Budget balance 7.74 7.29 11.2 10.5 10.0
(3.59)** (3.71)* (5.26)** (8.36) (8.36)
Openness Sachs-Warner 1.38 1.45 1.40 1.20 1.24
(0.389)*** (0.392)*** (0.735)* (0.536)** (0.551)**
Change in terms-of-trade 0.991
(0.590)*




Lagged natural disaster 1.32
(0.617)**
Observations 367 346 297 297 298
Adjusted R-squared 0.430 0.438 0.263 0.280 0.280
Table 8.  Robustness tests, Ordinary Least Squares estimator
Note: Dependent variable is (differenced, in regressions 3-5) four-year average GDP per capita growth. Robust and clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include period dummies and a constant term. For 
regressions 4 and 5, F-tests for the hypothesis that the instruments are not relevant are rejected at the 1 percent level. Influential observations in 
aid-growth space removed using Hadi (1992) procedure. For details see text.
Difference equations.  Dependent variable: ∆ GDP per capita growth           
(boldface coefficients correspond to instrumented varaibles)
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth
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2SLS 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM GMM
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth
Short-impact aid 0.880 0.702 0.798 0.804 0.648 0.720
(0.313)*** (0.324)** (0.317)** (0.246)*** (0.256)** (0.241)***
Short-impact aid squared -0.0532 -0.0401 -0.0415 -0.0344 -0.0479 -0.0358
(0.0253)** (0.0192)** (0.0258) (0.0199)* (0.0261)* (0.0190)*
Log repayments -0.518 -0.490 -0.506 -0.630 -0.551 -0.590
(0.199)*** (0.192)** (0.193)*** (0.165)*** (0.170)*** (0.168)***
Log initial GDP per capita -0.826 -0.985 -0.810 -1.04 -1.09 -1.00
(0.526) (0.524)* (0.485)* (0.444)** (0.447)** (0.408)**
East Asia 2.26 2.11 2.15 2.42 2.34 2.37
(0.621)*** (0.620)*** (0.629)*** (0.588)*** (0.597)*** (0.595)***
Tropics -2.14 -2.07 -2.32 -2.38 -2.35 -2.54
(0.390)*** (0.407)*** (0.372)*** (0.301)*** (0.338)*** (0.297)***
Log initial life expectancy 5.26 5.07 4.62 6.16 5.36 5.18
(1.88)*** (1.80)*** (1.71)*** (1.52)*** (1.53)*** (1.47)***
Institutional quality 0.392 0.393 0.361 0.375 0.376 0.332
(0.118)*** (0.141)*** (0.134)*** (0.108)*** (0.124)*** (0.121)***
Inflation -1.73 -1.59 -1.54 -1.64 -1.59 -1.61
(0.588)*** (0.685)** (0.668)** (0.415)*** (0.416)*** (0.404)***
Budget balance 8.46 9.33 11.1 7.49 10.5 12.5
(5.47) (7.18) (6.79) (4.40)* (5.93)* (5.28)**
Openness Sachs-Warner 1.56 1.77 1.80 1.58 1.59 1.72
(0.456)*** (0.506)*** (0.514)*** (0.384)*** (0.457)*** (0.469)***
Civil war -2.02 -1.88 -1.47 -1.32
(0.870)** (0.853)** (0.792)* (0.774)*
Lagged civil war 1.72 1.45 1.36 1.12
(0.705)** (0.665)** (0.641)** (0.565)**
Observations 368 367 365 368 367 365
Hansen J stat of over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.689 0.562 0.592 0.689 0.562 0.592
First order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.057 0.100 0.140 0.054 0.102 0.094
Second order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.085 0.066 0.057 0.077 0.061 0.049
Shea partial R-squared for aid 0.318 0.351 0.344 0.318 0.351 0.344
Shea partial R-squared for aid squared 0.260 0.296 0.290 0.260 0.296 0.290
Shea partial R-squared for log repayments 0.530 0.515 0.520 0.530 0.515 0.520
Shea partial R-squared for log inital GDP per capita 0.788 0.775 0.768 0.788 0.775 0.768
Shea partial R-squared for institutional quality 0.800 0.793 0.800 0.793
Shea partial R-squared for inflation 0.751 0.746 0.751 0.746
Shea partial R-squared for budget balance 0.400 0.410 0.400 0.410
Shea partial R-squared for openness 0.692 0.698 0.692 0.698
(Boldface coefficients correspond to instrumented variables)
Note: Dependent variable is four-year average GDP per capita growth.  Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include period dummies and a constant term. For all regressions, F-tests for the hypothesis that 
the instruments are not relevant are rejected at the 1 percent level. Influential observations in aid-growth space removed using Hadi (1992) procedure. 
For details see text.
Table 9. Robustness tests, testing for endogeneity of variables
57Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth Observed Bias Std. Err.
Short-impact aid 0.960 -0.156 0.317 0.525 1.90
Short-impact aid squared -0.0588 0.0116 0.0238 -0.132 -0.025
Log repayments -0.384 0.0419 0.206 -0.899 -0.035
Log initial GDP per capita -0.0593 -0.112 0.439 -0.799 0.944
East Asia 2.39 -0.0425 0.504 1.47 3.43
Tropics -2.13 0.0582 0.363 -2.93 -1.48
Log initial life expectancy 3.49 0.133 1.73 0.0394 7.00
Civil war -2.19 -0.0592 0.825 -3.91 -0.673
Lagged civil war 1.86 0.0544 0.736 0.395 3.25
Institutional quality 0.333 -0.000630 0.107 0.138 0.563
Inflation -1.60 -0.0604 0.511 -2.56 -0.494
Budget balance 8.28 0.181 4.41 -0.405 16.6
Openness Sachs-Warner 1.41 -0.00863 0.426 0.610 2.28
Table 10. Robustness test, bootstrapped core regression
[95% Conf. Interval]
Note: Dependent variable is four-year average GDP per capita growth.  For bootstrapping, 368 
observations are drawn, with replacement, from the full sample. The core regression is run each time 
on the resulting dataset, and this procedure is repeated 1,000 times. The resulting coefficients form 
the sampling distribution from which the 95 percent (bias-corrected) confidence intervals are 
calculated. 
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Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Short-impact aid 0.961 1.01 0.897 -2.72 1.04 0.973 0.436 1.02 0.840 0.915 1.06 0.956 0.594
(1.08) (0.333)*** (0.328)*** (2.07) (0.411)** (0.381)** (0.545) (0.346)*** (0.303)*** (0.381)** (0.403)*** (1.117) (0.423)
Short-impact aid squared -0.0460 -0.0603 -0.0580 -0.0370 -0.0686 -0.0648 -0.0483 -0.0667 -0.0429 -0.0570 -0.0637 -0.0769 -0.0466
(0.0135)*** (0.0268)** (0.0263)** (0.0120)*** (0.0360)* (0.0341)* (0.0316) (0.0293)** (0.0113)*** (0.0277)** (0.0294)** (0.0630) (0.0236)**
Log repayments -0.395 -0.409 -0.350 -0.426 -0.434 -0.384 -0.475 -0.440 -0.384 -0.381 -0.407 -0.451 -0.331
(0.186)** (0.195)** (0.188)* (0.165)** (0.204)** (0.190)** (0.179)*** (0.197)** (0.185)** (0.186)** (0.193)** (0.251)* (0.180)*
Log initial GDP per capita -0.170 0.116 -0.056 -0.187 -0.109 -0.0175 -0.102 -0.0285 -0.190 -0.0845 -0.0334 -0.144 -0.235
(0.644) (0.528) (0.535) (0.535) (0.476) (0.535) (0.603) (0.499) (0.591) (0.500) (0.500) (0.531) (0.534)
East Asia 2.44 0.648 2.39 2.39 2.33 2.33 2.62 2.33 2.43 2.42 2.34 2.33 2.34
(0.621)*** (1.470) (0.646)*** (0.604)*** (0.657)*** (0.652)*** (0.683)*** (0.653)*** (0.672)*** (0.658)*** (0.660)*** (0.653)*** (0.636)***
Tropics -1.95 -2.24 -2.16 -2.13 -2.12 -2.06 -2.08 -2.18 -1.97 -2.10 -2.17 -2.11 -2.04
(0.401)*** (0.443)*** (0.607)*** (0.389)*** (0.396)*** (0.395)*** (0.500)*** (0.417)*** (0.395)*** (0.418)*** (0.420)*** (0.517)*** (0.517)***
Log initial life expectancy 3.87 3.12 3.52 -0.95 4.09 3.38 3.66 3.23 3.72 3.54 3.35 3.87 3.39
(1.88)** (1.93) (1.88)* (3.39) (2.02)** (1.89)* (1.97)* (1.88)* (1.88)** (1.84)* (1.85)* (1.69)** (1.79)*
Civil war -2.22 -2.16 -2.01 -1.37 -3.44 -2.17 -2.23 -2.27 -2.24 -2.21 -2.20 -2.52 -2.23
(0.891)** (0.903)** (0.873)** (0.759)* (1.713)** (0.895)** (0.906)** (0.923)** (0.888)** (0.879)** (0.910)** (1.00)** (0.881)**
Lagged civil war 1.98 1.80 1.56 1.48 1.83 0.698 2.00 1.81 2.00 1.86 1.84 2.21 2.06
(0.705)*** (0.727)** (0.703)** (0.649)** (0.797)** (1.800) (0.713)*** (0.737)** (0.711)*** (0.722)*** (0.740)** (0.959)** (0.810)**
Institutional quality 0.342 0.406 0.345 0.424 0.323 0.331 0.115 0.331 0.335 0.344 0.326 0.332 0.359
(0.121)*** (0.139)*** (0.114)*** (0.117)*** (0.117)*** (0.115)*** (0.244) (0.117)*** (0.106)*** (0.120)*** (0.117)*** (0.130)** (0.116)***
Inflation -1.68 -1.54 -1.62 -1.87 -1.72 -1.70 -1.63 -1.99 -1.67 -1.62 -1.74 -1.67 -1.64
(0.634)*** (0.542)*** (0.553)*** (0.667)*** (0.607)*** (0.611)*** (0.583)*** (0.775)** (0.581)*** (0.567)*** (0.639)*** (0.602)*** (0.580)***
Budget balance 9.64 9.57 8.47 7.53 8.13 7.90 8.76 8.38 3.37 8.20 8.76 8.36 8.04
(5.79)* (5.71)* (5.44) (4.87) (5.44) (5.44) (5.63) (5.47) (11.77) (5.53) (5.74) (7.69) (6.06)
Openness Sachs-Warner 1.27 1.30 1.33 1.39 1.40 1.39 1.45 1.50 1.31 1.25 1.56 1.46 1.38
(0.431)*** (0.506)** (0.451)*** (0.424)*** (0.488)*** (0.465)*** (0.450)*** (0.465)*** (0.429)*** (0.738)* (0.530)*** (0.518)*** (0.489)***
Short-impact aid x log inital GDP per capita -0.0234
(0.134)
Short-impact aid x East Asia 2.94
(2.49)
Short-impact aid x tropics 0.0464
(0.252)
Short-impact aid x log inital life expectancy 0.833
(0.514)
Short-impact aid x civil war 0.362
(0.393)
Short-impact aid x lagged civil war 0.312
(0.420)
Short-impact aid x institutional quality 0.0975
(0.113)
Short-impact aid x inflation 0.167
(0.153)
Short-impact aid x budget balance 1.94
(3.43)
Short-impact aid x openness 0.0545
(0.173)
Short-impact aid x policy -0.0305
(0.0493)
Short-impact aid in 1982-89 -0.148 0.316
(1.72) (0.898)
Short-impact aid squared in 1982-89 0.0296
(0.114)
Short-impact aid in 1990-01 0.0565 0.150
(1.30) (0.511)
Short-impact aid squared in 1990-01 0.0231
(0.0648)
Observations 368 368 366 364 368 368 366 368 370 368 368 370 368
R-squared 0.386 0.358 0.391 0.375 0.355 0.374 0.354 0.376 0.363 0.391 0.382 0.322 0.356
Hansen J stat of over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.488 0.681 0.591 0.400 0.813 0.726 0.743 0.864 0.404 0.727 0.802 0.452 0.505
Table 11. Aid interaction effects, 1 of 2
Note: Dependent variable is four-year average GDP per capita growth. Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include period dummies and a constant term. Aid, aid 
squared and repayments are instrumented. For all regressions,  F-tests for the hypothesis that the instruments are not relevant are rejected at the 1 percent level. Influential observations in aid-growth space removed using Hadi (1992) procedure. For details see 
text.123456789 1 0
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
Short-impact aid 0.931 0.798 0.616 0.605 -3.47 -2.32 0.424 0.356 0.751 0.884
(1.09) (0.856) (0.384) (0.291)** (1.98)* (1.45) (0.341) (0.273) (0.248)*** (0.217)***
Short-impact aid squared -0.0437 -0.0448 -0.0282 -0.0316 -0.0416 -0.0379 -0.0519 -0.0651 -0.0458 -0.0400
(0.0133)*** (0.0108)*** (0.0124)** (0.0093)*** (0.0118)*** (0.0081)*** (0.0211)** (0.0131)*** (0.0149)*** (0.0121)***
Log repayments -0.304 -0.413 -0.200 -0.299 -0.450 -0.535 -0.460 -0.568 -0.407 -0.516
(0.173)* (0.151)*** (0.162) (0.147)** (0.173)*** (0.160)*** (0.178)*** (0.161)*** (0.186)** (0.156)***
Log initial GDP per capita -0.227 -0.363 -0.573 -0.375 0.010 -0.404 -0.138 -0.153 -0.349 -0.700
(0.640) (0.480) (0.485) (0.428) (0.517) (0.414) (0.591) (0.479) (0.488) (0.386)*
East Asia 2.33 2.46 2.31 2.38 2.44 2.70 2.51 2.96 2.31 2.24
(0.634)*** (0.601)*** (0.611)*** (0.574)*** (0.607)*** (0.564)*** (0.688)*** (0.624)*** (0.660)*** (0.632)***
Tropics -1.93 -2.05 -1.68 -2.13 -2.27 -2.35 -2.13 -2.36 -2.01 -2.23
(0.389)*** (0.349)*** (0.584)*** (0.535)*** (0.372)*** (0.290)*** (0.507)*** (0.353)*** (0.390)*** (0.331)***
Log initial life expectancy 3.89 3.94 3.16 3.62 -2.05 0.15 3.52 3.80 3.78 4.72
(1.87)** (1.54)** (1.75)* (1.47)** (3.31) (2.46) (1.90)* (1.61)** (1.82)** (1.56)***
Civil war -2.22 -1.61 -1.60 -1.72 -1.32 -1.70 -2.23 -1.57 -2.21 -2.03
(0.880)** (0.795)** (0.706)** (0.615)*** (0.771)* (0.721)** (0.901)** (0.827)* (0.904)** (0.848)**
Lagged civil war 2.01 1.32 1.38 1.39 1.39 1.38 2.01 1.56 1.95 1.63
(0.705)*** (0.623)** (0.517)*** (0.481)*** (0.625)** (0.582)** (0.698)*** (0.621)** (0.710)*** (0.614)***
Institutional quality 0.358 0.380 0.389 0.337 0.419 0.398 0.103 0.008 0.333 0.290
(0.118)*** (0.108)*** (0.118)*** (0.099)*** (0.118)*** (0.108)*** (0.272) (0.196) (0.112)*** (0.102)***
Inflation -1.66 -1.05 -1.29 -1.14 -1.86 -1.68 -1.63 -1.06 -1.86 -1.69
(0.630)*** (0.423)** (0.461)*** (0.392)*** (0.658)*** (0.534)*** (0.558)*** (0.354)*** (0.519)*** (0.450)***
Budget balance 9.44 6.49 9.06 6.82 6.89 5.90 7.78 4.64 9.18 10.40
(5.70)* (4.81) (5.21)* (4.29) (4.86) (4.22) (5.34) (4.58) (6.50) (5.81)*
Openness Sachs-Warner 1.28 1.26 1.10 1.32 1.52 1.43 1.52 1.50 1.33 1.80
(0.430)*** (0.388)*** (0.440)** (0.384)*** (0.431)*** (0.371)*** (0.468)*** (0.383)*** (0.585)** (0.513)***
Short aid-impact x log inital GDP per capita -0.0279 -0.00569
(0.133) (0.102)
Short aid-impact x tropics -0.198 -0.019
(0.431) (0.355)
Short aid-impact x log inital life expectancy 1.04 0.748
(0.485)** (0.352)**
Short aid-impact x institutional quality 0.104 0.162
(0.122) (0.086)*
Short aid-impact x policy 0.0123 -0.102
(0.0952) (0.0733)
Observations 368 368 356 356 363 363 370 370 367 367
R-squared 0.385 0.368 0.399 0.379 0.374 0.386 0.350 0.278 0.387 0.375
Hansen J stat of over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.315 0.315 0.286 0.286 0.563 0.563 0.613 0.613 0.523 0.523
Table 12. Aid interaction effects, 2 of 2
Note: Dependent variable is four-year average GDP per capita growth.  Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include period 
dummies and a constant term. Aid, aid squared and repayments are instrumented. For all regressions,  F-tests for the hypothesis that the instruments are not relevant are rejected at the 1 percent level. Influential 
observations in interaction term-growth space removed using Hadi (1992) procedure. For details see text.
60Elasticities All LAC E. Europe MENA SSA LAC E. Europe MENA SSA
All E. Asia All E. Asia
Short-impact aid lagged 0.484 1.039 2.70 1.25 2.02 0.68 0.45 3.82 4.97 -0.70 -0.33 -0.97 -1.09 0.54 1.10
Short-impact aid squared lagged -0.0276 -0.420 19.13 5.38 13.30 0.85 0.90 33.44 38.47 0.38 0.16 0.50 0.50 -0.39 -0.53
Log repayments -0.307 -0.420 -1.72 -2.12 -1.69 -2.19 -3.48 -1.39 -1.03 0.12 -0.01 0.15 0.54 -0.10 -0.21
Log initial GDP per capita -0.370 -2.24 7.59 7.96 7.76 8.07 8.39 7.90 6.77 -0.14 -0.06 -0.18 -0.29 -0.11 0.30
East Asia 2.10 - 0.12 0.00 0.62 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25 1.05 1.85 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
Tropics -1.94 - 0.70 0.79 0.68 0.80 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.16 0.05 -0.18 1.36 1.36 -0.58
Log initial life expectancy 3.23 10.5 4.09 4.18 4.16 4.20 4.25 4.16 3.87 0.30 0.23 0.36 0.51 0.24 -0.70
Civil war -2.22 - 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.11 -0.05 0.05 0.14 0.24 0.00 -0.01
Lagged civil war 1.95 - 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.05 -0.06 -0.11 -0.20 0.01 0.02
Institutional quality 0.341 1.22 4.51 4.33 5.14 5.51 5.73 4.35 4.11 -0.06 0.22 0.34 0.42 -0.05 -0.14
Inflation -1.97 -0.368 0.23 0.36 0.08 0.07 0.30 0.09 0.22 -0.25 0.31 0.32 -0.12 0.28 0.03
Budget balance 7.74 0.202 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.19 -0.06 -0.09 -0.01
Openness Sachs-Warner 1.38 0.463 0.42 0.43 0.58 0.85 0.76 0.42 0.24 0.01 0.22 0.58 0.47 0.00 -0.25
1974-78 dummy 2.47 - 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.17 -0.02 -0.05
1978-81 dummy 1.28 - 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.01
1982-85 dummy -0.316 - 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01
1986-89 dummy 0.931 - 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.01
1990-93 dummy 0.210 - 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
1994-97 dummy - - 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.16 0.15 ------
1998-2001 dummy -0.821 - 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.33 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.15 -0.03 0.01
Constant -11.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average growth rate, observed 1.26 0.66 3.55 4.31 2.87 2.33 -0.23
Average difference in growth, explained -0.63 1.90 3.06 1.62 1.35 -1.28
Average difference in growth, observed, check -0.59 2.30 3.06 1.61 1.07 -1.49
Difference -0.04 -0.40 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.21
Average effect of aid on difference in growth -0.32 -0.17 -0.47 -0.58 0.15 0.57
Observations 368 131 71 44 21 38 107 131 71 44 21 38 107
Countries 67 20 11 7 7 7 22 20 11 7 77 2 2




Note: Countries are classified into regions according to standard World Bank definitions. East Asia includes China, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. For consistency, elasticities for 
dummy variables are excluded.
Average values of regressors
Contibution of each variable to the difference in per capita growth 
relative to average for all countries






































Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Net EDA/PPP GDP -0.242 0.0576 -0.218 -0.176 -1.17 0.113 0.428
(0.259) (0.226) (0.266) (0.273) (0.825) (0.146) (0.446)
Net EDA/PPP GDP * policy 0.253 0.0719
(0.121)** (0.0678)
Net EDA/PPP GDP squared 0.177 -0.0384
(0.149) (0.0533)
Short-impact ODA/PPP GDP 0.470 0.822
(0.403) (0.379)**
Short-impact ODA/PPP GDP squared -0.0602 -0.100
(0.0366) (0.0370)***
Short-impact ODA/XR GDP 0.506 0.684 0.960
(0.227)** (0.228)*** (0.328)***
Short-impact ODA/XR GDP squared -0.0309 -0.0408 -0.0588
(0.0131)** (0.0130)*** (0.0264)**
Net ODA/PPP GDP 0.358
(0.205)*
Net ODA/PPP GDP squared -0.0268
(0.0126)**
Net ODA/XR GDP 0.285
(0.111)**
Net ODA/XR GDP squared -0.00845
(0.00346)**
Gross ODA/XR GDP 0.278
(0.104)***
Gross ODA/XR GDP squared -0.00702
(0.00295)**
Log repayments/PPP GDP -0.231 -0.366
(0.291) (0.243)
Log repayments/XR GDP -0.090 -0.219 -0.204 -0.384
(0.290) (0.216) (0.224) (0.188)**
Log initial GDP per capita -0.832 -0.628 -0.365 -0.406 -0.604 -0.207 0.248 -0.101 0.046 0.0507 0.277 0.0828 0.217 -0.220 -0.0593
(0.774) (0.799) (0.638) (0.630) (0.669) (0.628) (0.680) (0.526) (0.622) (0.576) (0.557) (0.655) (0.625) (0.620) (0.493)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.672 -0.672 -0.121 -0.187 0.036 0.071 0.286
(0.844) (0.850) (0.816) (0.814) (0.834) (0.750) (0.741)
Assasinations -0.760 -0.780 -0.293 -0.303 -0.249 -0.337 -0.315
(0.445)* (0.450)* (0.223) (0.225) (0.232) (0.227) (0.224)
Ethnic * assasinations 0.634 1.029 0.047 0.074 -0.017 0.135 0.162
(0.903) (0.877) (0.605) (0.601) (0.607) (0.611) (0.611)
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.11 -1.96 -1.39 -1.34 -1.20 -1.65 -1.84
(0.727)*** (0.741)*** (0.648)** (0.648)** (0.643)* (0.705)** (0.768)**
East Asia 1.46 0.65 0.80 0.63 0.47 0.78 1.01 2.04 2.18 2.27 2.43 2.38 2.35 2.07 2.39
(0.712)** (0.595) (0.519) (0.492) (0.502) (0.507) (0.528)* (0.446)*** (0.475)*** (0.471)*** (0.471)*** (0.471)*** (0.465)*** (0.455)*** (0.648)***
Institutional quality 0.845 0.811 0.395 0.386 0.426 0.398 0.409 0.321 0.302 0.316 0.316 0.321 0.315 0.326 0.333
(0.193)*** (0.196)*** (0.134)*** (0.136)*** (0.141)*** (0.136)*** (0.139)*** (0.105)*** (0.111)*** (0.107)*** (0.104)*** (0.104)*** (0.105)*** (0.107)*** (0.114)***
M2/GDP lagged 0.025 0.022 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.007
(0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Policy index 0.591 1.17 0.869 0.994 1.04 1.00 0.942
(0.378) (0.243)*** (0.171)*** (0.128)*** (0.140)*** (0.148)*** (0.146)***
Tropics -1.71 -1.81 -1.80 -1.85 -1.84 -1.86 -1.78 -2.13
(0.360)*** (0.374)*** (0.377)*** (0.369)*** (0.371)*** (0.378)*** (0.382)*** (0.398)***
Log initial life expectancy 1.74 1.81 1.92 2.50 2.76 2.24 2.14 3.49
(1.93) (1.91) (1.90) (1.95) (2.12) (2.14) (2.13) (1.85)*
Civil war -2.29 -2.37 -2.33 -2.39 -2.32 -2.39 -2.30 -2.19
(0.778)*** (0.810)*** (0.796)*** (0.798)*** (0.804)*** (0.814)*** (0.810)*** (0.891)**
Lagged civil war 1.85 1.90 1.86 2.06 1.93 2.03 1.71 1.86
(0.661)*** (0.693)*** (0.666)*** (0.671)*** (0.664)*** (0.679)*** (0.667)** (0.730)**
Inflation -2.02 -1.96 -1.93 -1.73 -1.82 -1.71 -2.05 -1.60
(0.408)*** (0.411)*** (0.422)*** (0.445)*** (0.457)*** (0.453)*** (0.436)*** (0.558)***
Budget balance 5.20 5.13 4.60 6.94 6.43 6.42 4.07 8.28
(4.60) (4.58) (4.63) (4.48) (4.48) (4.66) (4.80) (5.47)
Openness Sachs-Warner 1.17 1.18 1.07 1.00 1.10 1.17 1.37 1.41
(0.393)*** (0.401)*** (0.404)*** (0.400)** (0.417)*** (0.430)*** (0.439)*** (0.456)***
Observations 184 184 361 361 361 361 361 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 368
R-squared 0.472 0.457 0.346 0.339 0.313 0.338 0.332 0.404 0.392 0.391 0.393 0.389 0.375 0.379 0.388
Hansen J stat of over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.233 0.155 0.005 0.009 0.019 0.002 0.001 0.082 0.155 0.168 0.256 0.256 0.646 0.436 0.773
Shea partial R-squared for aid 0.393 0.416 0.272 0.178 0.108 0.532 0.460 0.612 0.316 0.690 0.641 0.627 0.491 0.544 0.314
Table 14.  Links to the recent literature: the evolution from Burnside and Dollar to our results
Note: Dependent variable is four-year average GDP per capita growth.  Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include period dummies and a constant term. Aid, aid squared and repayments are 






Reg 3, with 
dissag aid
Reg 3, with 
new controls Core
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Net ODA 0.241 0.237 0.237 0.248
(0.103)** (0.117)** (0.133)* (0.105)**
Net ODA squared -0.00764 -0.00654 -0.00654 -0.00660
(0.00320)** (0.00337)* (0.00370)* (0.00358)*
Short-impact aid 0.846 0.960
(0.405)** (0.328)***
Short-impact aid squared -0.0491 -0.0588
(0.0207)** (0.0264)**
Log repayments -0.539 -0.384
(0.607) (0.188)**
Log initial GDP per capita 0.087 0.437 0.437 0.152 0.0178 -0.059
(0.605) (0.627) (0.531) (0.616) (0.402) (0.493)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.111 0.455 0.455 0.251
(0.940) (0.733) (0.988) (1.015)
Assasinations -0.460 -0.313 -0.313 -0.340
(0.228)** (0.228) (0.211) (0.215)
Ethnic * assasinations 0.919 0.171 0.171 0.222
(0.423)** (0.612) (0.595) (0.601)
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.25 -1.71 -1.71 -1.96
(0.755)*** (0.673)** (0.788)** (1.01)*
East Asia 1.52 1.25 1.25 1.28 2.33 2.39
(0.627)** (0.562)** (0.734)* (0.789) (0.630)*** (0.648)***
Institutional quality 0.811 0.423 0.423 0.465 0.301 0.333
(0.177)*** (0.132)*** (0.138)*** (0.148)*** (0.107)*** (0.114)***
M2/GDP lagged 0.010 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
(0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Inflation -1.13 -1.91 -1.91 -1.87 -1.80 -1.60
(0.493)** (0.405)*** (0.436)*** (0.429)*** (0.541)*** (0.558)***
Budget balance 9.12 7.42 7.42 6.92 8.29 8.28
(3.66)** (4.84) (6.68) (7.04) (5.30) (5.47)
Openness Sachs-Warner 1.69 1.38 1.38 1.68 1.16 1.41
(0.505)*** (0.421)*** (0.446)*** (0.519)*** (0.435)*** (0.456)***
Tropics -2.11 -2.13
(0.374)*** (0.398)***
Log initial life expectancy 3.37 3.49
(1.71)** (1.85)*
Civil war -1.90 -2.19
(0.726)*** (0.891)**
Lagged civil war 1.78 1.86
(0.494)*** (0.730)**
Constant -2.98 -4.44 -4.44 -3.17 -13.69 -12.86
(3.96) (4.76) (4.10) (4.15) (5.98)** (6.24)**
Observations 231 357 357 356 368 368
R-squared 0.379 0.323 0.323 0.279 0.444 0.388
Hansen J stat of over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.795 0.158 0.263 0.514 0.300 0.773
Influential observations removed using Hadi procedure N YYYYY
Table 15.  Links to the recent literature: the evolution from Hansen and Tarp to our results
Note: Dependent variable is four-year average GDP per capita growth.  Robust standard errors in parentheses for regressions 1 and 2. Robust and 
clustered standard errors for regression 3 onwards, to correct for autocorrelation. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
regressions include period dummies and a constant term. Aid, aid squared and repayments are instrumented. For all regressions,  F-tests for the 
hypothesis that the instruments are not relevant are rejected at the 1 percent level. For details see text.
63A Data Appendix
Time periods. Observations for all variables are four-year arithmetic averages unless data are miss-
ing (in which case averages for non-missing data are used) or otherwise speci￿ed. Time period 1
represents the years 1974-77. Likewise, 2: 1978-81, 3: 1982-85, 4: 1986-89, 5: 1990-93, 6: 1994-97,
7: 1998-2001.
Short-impact, long-impact and humanitarian aid. In percent of GDP. Data for the numerator
come from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) 2003 and Donor Assistance Committee (DAC) 2003
databases maintained by the OECD. The numerator for ￿short-impact￿aid is the product across all
donors, for each recipient, of ￿Total ODA (OA) Gross￿from the online DAC 2003 database, Table 2a,
with the elements of CRS ￿eld ￿usd_amount￿classi￿ed as ￿S￿in Appendix Table 1, divided by the
sum of all aid in DAC ￿eld ￿Total ODA (OA) Commitments,￿multiplied by 100. ￿Long-impact￿and
￿humanitarian￿aid are similarly calculated, according to the ￿L￿or ￿H￿classi￿cation in Appendix
Table 1. The denominator is GDP in current USD from the World Development Indicators 2003.
Tables 3 and 4 and ￿gure 1 compare these aid estimates to actual data for the 1990s. The latter
are calculated as follows: from the CRS database, the ￿eld ￿usd_disbursement,￿is totaled by the
recipient-year and type of aid, ￿S,￿￿L￿or ￿H.￿This is divided by total disbursements in the CRS
database, which is then multiplied by ￿Total ODA (OA) Gross￿from the DAC 2003 CD-ROM.
Net ODA. In percent of GDP. Numerator is the ￿eld ￿Total ODA (OA) Net￿from the DAC
2003 online database, table 2a. The denominator is GDP in current USD from World Development
Indicators 2003.
Gross ODA. In percent of GDP. Numerator from the DAC 2003 CD-ROM. Denominator is GDP
in current USD from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators 2003.
Per capita real GDP growth. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant
local currency. From the World Development Indicators 2003 ￿eld ￿GDP per capita growth (annual
%).￿
Repayments on aid. In percent of GDP or natural logarithm of repayments in percent of GDP.
￿Total ODA (OA) Gross￿minus ￿Total ODA (OA) Net￿from the DAC database as a percent of
GDP in current USD from World Development Indicators 2003.
Log initial GDP per capita. GDP per capita in 1996 USD for the ￿rst year of the period.
Data from Penn World Tables version 6. Data ￿rst introduced in robert Summers and Alan Heston
(1991), ￿The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-88,￿
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (2): 327-368.
East Asia. Dummy for China, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand.
Tropics. 0/1 dummy, indicative of location in tropics. William Easterly (2001) ￿The Middle
Class Consensus and Economic Development￿Journal of Economic Growth, 6 (4): 317-336.
Log initial life expectancy. Missing data linearly interpolated. From World Development Indica-
tors 2003.
Institutional Quality. Continuous variable between 0 and 10, commonly known as the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide (ICRGE) indicator. Average of corruption, bureaucratic quality and rule
of law indicators published in Political Risk Group￿ s IRIS III dataset. Composite indicator extended
by David Roodman, ￿Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development and Cross-Country Empirics.￿Center
for Global Development, Working Paper 32, September 2003.
In￿ation. Natural logarithm of 1+consumer price in￿ ation rate. World Development Indicators
2003 and International Financial Statistics 2003.
Budget balance. Ratio to GDP. Numerator is ￿overall budget balance, including grants￿￿eld
from the World Development Indicators 2003; denominator is GDP in current USD from the World
Development Indicators 2003. Where data are missing series 80 and 99b (local-currency budget
surplus and GDP) of the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics 2003 are used.
Openness. Dummy variable averaged over four years. From Je⁄rey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner
A - 1(1995), ￿Economic reform and the process of global integration.￿Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 1995: 1-118; Romain Wacziarg and Karen Welch Horn (2002),. ￿Trade Liberalization and
Growth: New Evidence,￿processed, Stanford University, November; and Roodman (2003).
Policy index. Linear combination of in￿ ation, budget balance and openness variables as per
Craig Burnside and David Dollar (2000), ￿Aid, Policies, and Growth.￿American Economic Review,
90 (4): 847-868.
Arms imports. Lagged, and in percent of GDP. Data compiled by Burnside and Dollar (2000)
from US Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington, DC,
various years.
Land area. Squared Kilometers. Data from CIA World Factbook 2003.
Coastline. Kilometers. Data from CIA World Factbook 2003.
Secondary school enrolment ratio. Gross (ratio of the total enrollment, regardless of age, to the
population of the secondary school age group), percent. Missing data are linearly interpolated. Data
from World Development Indicators 2003.
Natural resource abundance. Primary products exports as a percent of GDP. Calculated as
(ores and metal exports + agricultural exports + fuel exports + food exports, all as a percent of
merchandise exports) times merchandise exports (where unavailable, exports of goods), as a percent
of GDP. All series from World Development Indicators 2003.
Positive and negative commodity shocks. Shocks in percent of GDP, and are based on commodity
price index changes. From Jan Dehn (2000), ￿Commodity Price Uncertainty in Developing Coun-
tries.￿Working Paper 122. Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series. May.
Supplemented by dataset extension in Roodman 2003.
Natural disaster. Number of droughts, earthquakes, famines and ￿ oods divided by GDP. Numer-
ator from the Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT) 2003, compiled by the Center for Research
on the Epidemiology of Disasters. Denominator is GDP in current USD from World Development
Indicators 2003.
Civil War. The dichotomous civil war variable was constructed by combining information from
the Correlates of War 2 (COW2) database (Meredith Reid Sarkees [2000], ￿The Correlates of War
Data on War: An Update to 1997,￿Con￿ict Management and Peace Science 18 [1]: 123-144) and
the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Armed Con￿ ict Database (Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter
Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and H￿vard Strand [2002], ￿Armed con￿ ict
1946-2001: A new dataset,￿Journal of Peace Research 39 [5]: 615-637). First, a country-period was
assigned the value of 1 if any part of an ￿intrastate war￿in COW2 occurred during that period.
Country-periods of war were then modi￿ed if the dates of the con￿ ict in PRIO were materially dif-
ferent (giving PRIO precedence), if the number of deaths was very small relative to the population,
or if the area a⁄ected by the war was isolated from economic centers and therefore unlikely to sub-
stantially a⁄ect national economic growth. Accordingly the following changes were made: Colombia
starting period changed from 3 to 4 and ending period from 6 to 5 based on PRIO; Iran ending period
changed from 3 to 4 based on PRIO; Sri Lanka ending period changed from 3 to 4 based on PRIO;
Sierra Leone ending period changed from 6 to 7 based on PRIO; and the following country-periods
were omitted based on the small number of casualties relative to population or isolation of war-
a⁄ected area from economic centers: AZE5-6, BDI4-5, ETH1-3, GEO5-6, IND3-7, IRN2, KHM5-6,
NGA2-3, PAK1, PAK6, PHL1-2, ROM4, RUS6, RWA5, TUR5-6, UGA6-7, YEM4, YEM6, YUG5,
ZAR5, ZAR6-7. PHL3 and PHL5 were set to ￿1￿based on PRIO. Thus the following were considered
catastrophic civil wars likely to in￿ uence national economic growth: AFG2-5, AGO1-5, AGO5-6,
BDI5-7, BIH5-6, COG6-7, COL4-7, DZA5-7, ETH1-5, GNB7-7, GTM2-3, IRN2-4, IRQ1, IRQ3-
6, KHM1-5, LBN1-5, LBR4-6, LKA4-7, MMR3-6, MOZ2-5, NIC2-5, PER3-6, RWA6-6, SDN3-7,
SLE5-7, SLV2-5, SOM3-6, TCD2-4, TJK5-6, UGA2-4, ZWE1-2.
Change in terms-of-trade. Percentage change in good and services terms-of-trade index over the
four year period. Terms-of-trade index from communication with World Bank sta⁄.
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Appendix Table 1. Classifying aid by lag of expected impact       
S = short-impact aid, L = long-impact aid, and H = humanitarian aid 
 
  1997-01  commitments   
DAC5 (3 digit) code and CRS (5 digit) purpose codes  (USD m)  percent  Category 
     
110   EDUCATION  324  0.1  L 
111   Education, level unspecified  643  0.3  L 
  11110 Education policy and administrative management  2,383  1.1  L 
  11120 Education facilities and training  761  0.3  L 
  11130 Teacher training  234  0.1  L 
  11181 Educational research  13  0.0  L 
112   Basic education  211  0.1  L 
  11220 Primary education  3,965  1.8  L 
  11230 Basic life skills for youth and adults    486  0.2  L 
  11240 Early childhood education  51  0.0  L 
113   Secondary education  0  0.0  L 
  11320 Secondary education  843  0.4  L 
  11330 Vocational training  1,002  0.4  L 
114   Post-secondary education  8  0.0  L 
  11420 Higher education  3,586  1.6  L 
  11430 Advanced technical and managerial training  428  0.2  L 
120   HEALTH  52  0.0  L 
121   Health, general  290  0.1  L 
  12110 Health policy and administrative management  3,850  1.7  L 
  12181 Medical education/training  166  0.1  L 
  12182 Medical research  45  0.0  L 
  12191 Medical services  1,128  0.5  L 
122   Basic health  10  0.0  L 
  12220 Basic health care  1,720  0.8  L 
  12230 Basic health infrastructure  1,026  0.5  L 
  12240 Basic nutrition  378  0.2  L 
  12250 Infectious disease control  1,546  0.7  L 
  12281 Health education  128  0.1  L 
  12282 Health personnel development  89  0.0  L 
130   POPULATION POLICIES/PROGRAMMES & REPROD. HEALTH  0  0.0  L 
  13010 Population policy and administrative management  460  0.2  L 
  13020 Reproductive health care  1,248  0.6  L 
  13030 Family planning  1,302  0.6  L 
  13040 STD control including HIV/AIDS  1,916  0.9  L 
  13081 Personnel development for population and reproductive health  1  0.0  L 
140   WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION  0  0.0  L 
  14010 Water resources policy and administrative management  1,218  0.5  L 
  14015 Water resources protection  596  0.3  L 
  14020 Water supply and sanitation - large systems  10,193  4.5  L 
  14030 Water supply and sanitation - small systems  1,663  0.7  L 
  14040 River development  1,035  0.5  L 
  14050 Waste management/disposal  624  0.3  L 
  14081 Education and training in water supply and sanitation    35  0.0  L 
150   GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY  0  0.0  L 
  15010 Economic and development policy/Planning  6,165  2.7  L  
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  1997-01  commitments   
DAC5 (3 digit) code and CRS (5 digit) purpose codes  (USD m)  percent  Category 
 
  15020 Public sector financial management  1,589  0.7  L 
  15030 Legal and judicial development  1,060  0.5  L 
  15040 Government administration  1,457  0.6  L 
  15050 Strengthening civil society  2,261  1.0  L 
  15061 Post conflict peace-building (UN)  898  0.4  S 
  15062 Elections  363  0.2  L 
  15063 Human rights  590  0.3  L 
  15064 Demobilisation  1,163  0.5  S 
  15065 Free flow of information  82  0.0  L 
  15066 Land mine clearance  258  0.1  S 
160   OTHER SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES  118  0.1  L 
161   Employment  0  0.0  L 
  16110 Employment policy and administrative management  666  0.3  L 
162   Housing  1  0.0  S 
  16210 Housing policy and administrative management  306  0.1  L 
  16220 Low-cost housing  313  0.1  S 
163   Other social services  1  0.0  L 
  16310 Social/ welfare services  3,617  1.6  L 
  16320 General government services  1,294  0.6  L 
  16330 Settlement  88  0.0  L 
  16340 Reconstruction relief  1,314  0.6  S 
  16350 Culture and recreation  1,063  0.5  L 
  16361 Narcotics control  2,313  1.0  L 
  16362 Statistical capacity building  45  0.0  L 
  16381 Research/scientific institutions  389  0.2  L 
210   TRANSPORT AND STORAGE  0  0.0  S 
  21010 Transport policy and administrative management  2,283  1.0  L 
  21020 Road transport  15,236  6.8  S 
  21030 Rail transport  5,737  2.6  S 
  21040 Water transport  2,273  1.0  S 
  21050 Air transport  1,880  0.8  S 
  21061 Storage  13  0.0  S 
  21081 Education and training in transport and storage  2  0.0  L 
220   COMMUNICATIONS  0  0.0  S 
  22010 Communications policy and administrative management  165  0.1  L 
  22020 Telecommunications  1,196  0.5  S 
  22030 Radio/television/print media  418  0.2  L 
230   ENERGY GENERATION AND SUPPLY  4  0.0  S 
  23010 Energy policy and administrative management  2,711  1.2  L 
  23020 Power generation/non-renewable sources    1,697  0.8  S 
  23030 Power generation/renewable sources    186  0.1  S 
  23040 Electrical transmission/ distribution  3,678  1.6  S 
  23050 Gas distribution  204  0.1  S 
  23061 Oil-fired power plants  161  0.1  S  
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  1997-01  commitments   
DAC5 (3 digit) code and CRS (5 digit) purpose codes  (USD m)  percent  Category 
 
  23062 Gas-fired power plants  369  0.2  S 
  23063 Coal-fired power plants  2,224  1.0  S 
  23064 Nuclear power plants  962  0.4  S 
  23065 Hydro-electric power plants  2,393  1.1  S 
  23066 Geothermal energy  157  0.1  S 
  23067 Solar energy  232  0.1  S 
  23068 Wind power  185  0.1  S 
  23069 Ocean power  0  0.0  S 
  23070 Biomass  20  0.0  S 
  23081 Energy education/training  35  0.0  L 
  23082 Energy research  12  0.0  L 
240   BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES  2  0.0  S 
  24010 Financial policy and administrative management  1,534  0.7  L 
  24020 Monetary institutions  93  0.0  S 
  24030 Formal sector financial intermediaries  1,237  0.6  S 
  24040 Informal/semi-formal financial intermediaries  665  0.3  S 
  24081 Education/training in banking and financial services  3  0.0  S 
250   BUSINESS AND OTHER SERVICES  0  0.0  S 
  25010 Business services  3,307  1.5  S 
  25020 Privatisation  2,032  0.9  S 
311   AGRICULTURE   0  0.0  S 
  31110 Agricultural policy and administrative management  3,514  1.6  L 
  31120 Agricultural development  1,835  0.8  S 
  31130 Agricultural land resources  1,161  0.5  S 
  31140 Agricultural water resources  3,029  1.3  S 
  31150 Agricultural inputs  1,076  0.5  S 
  31161 Food crop production  490  0.2  S 
  31162 Industrial crops/export crops  280  0.1  S 
  31163 Livestock  333  0.1  S 
  31164 Agrarian reform  234  0.1  S 
  31165 Agricultural alternative development  5  0.0  L 
  31181 Agricultural education/training  160  0.1  L 
  31182 Agricultural extension  102  0.0  S 
  31183 Agricultural research  433  0.2  L 
  31184 Livestock research  26  0.0  L 
  31191 Agricultural services  415  0.2  S 
  31192 Plant and post-harvest protection and pest control  54  0.0  S 
  31193 Agricultural financial services  688  0.3  S 
  31194 Agricultural co-operatives  70  0.0  S 
  31195 Livestock/veterinary services  69  0.0  S 
312   FORESTRY   1  0.0  S 
  31210 Forestry policy and administrative management  580  0.3  L 
  31220 Forestry development  1,140  0.5  S 
  31261 Fuelwood/charcoal  27  0.0  L 
  31281 Forestry education/training  22  0.0  L  
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  1997-01  commitments   
DAC5 (3 digit) code and CRS (5 digit) purpose codes  (USD m)  percent  Category 
 
  31282 Forestry research  34  0.0  L 
  31291 Forestry services  68  0.0  S 
313   FISHING   0  0.0  S 
  31310 Fishing policy and administrative management  264  0.1  L 
  31320 Fishery development  353  0.2  S 
  31381 Fishery education/training  75  0.0  L 
  31382 Fishery research  56  0.0  L 
  31391 Fishery services  304  0.1  S 
321   INDUSTRY  2  0.0  S 
  32110 Industrial policy and administrative management  218  0.1  L 
  32120 Industrial development  860  0.4  S 
  32130 SME development  1,289  0.6  S 
  32140 Cottage industries and handicraft  32  0.0  S 
  32161 Agro-industries  170  0.1  S 
  32162 Forest industries  27  0.0  S 
  32163 Textiles, leather and substitutes  73  0.0  S 
  32164 Chemicals    92  0.0  S 
  32165 Fertilizer plants  103  0.0  S 
  32166 Cement/lime/plaster  57  0.0  S 
  32167 Energy manufacturing  72  0.0  S 
  32168 Pharmaceutical production  6  0.0  S 
  32169 Basic metal industries  32  0.0  S 
  32170 Non-ferrous metal industries  4  0.0  S 
  32171 Engineering  12  0.0  S 
  32172 Transport equipment industry  82  0.0  S 
  32181 Technological research and development  80  0.0  L 
322   MINERAL RESOURCES AND MINING  0  0.0  S 
  32210 Mineral/mining policy and administrative management  311  0.1  L 
  32220 Mineral prospection and exploration  81  0.0  S 
  32261 Coal  326  0.1  S 
  32262 Oil and gas  187  0.1  S 
  32263 Ferrous metals  0  0.0  S 
  32264 Nonferrous metals  8  0.0  S 
  32265 Precious metals/materials  12  0.0  S 
  32266 Industrial minerals  1  0.0  S 
  32267 Fertilizer minerals  1  0.0  S 
  32268 Offshore minerals  0  0.0  S 
323   CONSTRUCTION  1  0.0  L 
  32310 Construction policy and administrative management  41  0.0  L 
331   TRADE  0  0.0  S 
  33110 Trade policy and administrative management  346  0.2  L 
  33120 Wholesale/retail trade  140  0.1  S 
  33130 Export promotion  104  0.0  S 
  33140 Multilateral trade negotiations  82  0.0  L 
  33181 Trade education/training  5  0.0  L  
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  1997-01  commitments   
DAC5 (3 digit) code and CRS (5 digit) purpose codes  (USD m)  percent  Category 
 
332   TOURISM  0  0.0  L 
  33210 Tourism policy and administrative management  208  0.1  L 
400   MULTISECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING  39  0.0  L 
410   General environmental protection  2  0.0  L 
  41010 Environmental policy and administrative management  2,399  1.1  L 
  41020 Biosphere protection  990  0.4  L 
  41030 Bio-diversity  754  0.3  L 
  41040 Site preservation  143  0.1  L 
  41050 Flood prevention/control  879  0.4  L 
  41081 Environmental education/ training  77  0.0  L 
  41082 Environmental research  64  0.0  L 
420   Women in development  0  0.0  L 
  42010 Women in development  258  0.1  L 
430   Other multisector  0  0.0  L 
  43010 Multisector aid  4,544  2.0  L 
  43020 Multisector aid for basic social services    567  0.3  L 
  43030 Urban development and management  2,456  1.1  L 
  43040 Rural development  4,753  2.1  L 
  43050 Non-agricultural alternative development  48  0.0  L 
  43081 Multisector education/training  79  0.0  L 
500   COMMODITY AID AND GENERAL PROGRAMME ASSISTANCE  0  0.0  S 
510   Structural Adjustment Assistance with World Bank/IMF  0  0.0  S 
  51010 Structural adjustment  6,145  2.7  S 
520   Developmental food aid/Food security assistance  0  0.0  H 
  52010 Food aid/Food security programmes  7,422  3.3  H 
530   Other general programme and commodity assistance  5  0.0  S 
  53010 Balance-of-payments support   10,144  4.5  S 
  53020 Budget support  1,034  0.5  S 
  53030 Import support (capital goods)   452  0.2  S 
  53040 Import support (commodities)   1,082  0.5  S 
600   ACTION RELATING TO DEBT  0  0.0  S 
  60010 Action relating to debt   141  0.1  S 
  60020 Debt forgiveness    11,639  5.2  S 
  60030 Relief of multilateral debt   496  0.2  S 
  60040 Rescheduling and refinancing   4,829  2.1  S 
  60061 Debt for development swap   86  0.0  S 
  60062 Other debt swap   117  0.1  S 
  60063 Debt buy-back   61  0.0  S 
700   EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE  392  0.2  H 
710   Emergency food aid  0  0.0  H 
  71010 Emergency food aid  1,819  0.8  H 
720   Other emergency and distress relief  0  0.0  H 
  72010 Emergency/distress relief   7,964  3.5  H 
  72020 Aid to refugees (in donor country)   823  0.4  H 
  72030 Aid to refugees (in recipient countries)   803  0.4  H  
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  1997-01  commitments   
DAC5 (3 digit) code and CRS (5 digit) purpose codes  (USD m)  percent  Category 
 
910   ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF DONORS  0  0.0  -- 
  91010 Administrative costs  256  0.1  -- 
920   SUPPORT TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS  0  0.0  L 
  92010 Support to national NGOs  39  0.0  L 
  92020 Support to international NGOs  17  0.0  L 
  92030 Support to local and regional NGOs  29  0.0  L 
998   UNALLOCATED/ UNSPECIFIED  5  0.0  L 
  99810 Sectors not specified  2,474  1.1  L 
  99820 Promotion of development awareness  41  0.0  -- 
 
 
Summary statistics, 1997-01 commitments  Humanitarian  Short impact  Long impact  Total 
Total (USD m)  19,222  101,801  103,302  224,708 
Percent  of  total  8.6 45.3 46.0  100.0 
 
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per capita GDP growth 372 1.28 3.53 -12.74 16.49
Net ODA 372 4.77 6.28 -0.12 36.03
Gross aid 372 5.34 6.86 0.01 41.61
Short-impact aid 372 2.84 3.69 0.00 20.02
Long-impact aid 372 2.04 3.10 0.00 24.78
Humanitarian aid 372 0.46 0.84 0.00 7.67
Repayments 372 0.57 0.86 0.00 5.59
Net ODA squared 372 62.10 155.12 0.00 1297.93
Gross aid squared 372 75.34 187.34 0.00 1731.67
Short-impact aid squared 372 21.61 50.54 0.00 400.80
Long-impact aid squared 372 13.74 47.52 0.00 614.25
Humanitarian aid squared 372 0.91 4.02 0.00 58.79
Repayments squared 372 1.06 3.66 0.00 31.21
Log repayments 372 -1.54 1.44 -8.24 1.68
Log initial GDP per capita 372 7.60 0.80 5.22 9.71
East Asia 372 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Tropics 372 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
Log initial life expectancy 372 4.09 0.18 3.55 4.35
Civil war 372 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00
Lagged civil war 372 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Institutional quality 372 4.50 1.71 0.00 10.00
Inflation 372 0.23 0.40 -0.04 3.22
Budget balance 372 -0.03 0.04 -0.31 0.15
Openness, Sachs Warner 372 0.42 0.48 0.00 1.00
Policy index 372 1.28 1.17 -5.89 3.19
Egypt 372 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
Arms imports 372 0.05 0.11 0.00 1.16
Land area 372 0.89 1.73 0.00 17.08
Coastline 372 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05
Secondary school enrolment ratio 371 41.65 23.18 1.93 103.25
Natural resource abundance 372 15.47 11.88 0.69 74.09
Positive commodity shock 314 0.08 0.20 0.00 1.08
Negative commodity shock 314 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.78
Natural disaster 372 0.27 0.47 0.00 4.86
Change in terms of trade 352 0.03 0.29 -0.70 1.84
Short aid * log initial GDP per capita 372 19.97 25.54 0.00 141.72
Short aid * East Asia 372 0.07 0.26 0.00 2.11
Short aid * tropics 372 2.35 3.57 0.00 20.02
Short aid * log initial life expectancy 372 11.27 14.49 0.00 84.27
Short aid * civil war 372 0.39 1.78 0.00 16.15
Short aid * lagged civil war 372 0.44 2.02 0.00 20.02
Short aid * institutional quality 372 11.81 17.01 0.00 116.51
Short aid * inflation 372 0.61 2.09 -0.10 31.10
Short aid * budget balance 372 -0.13 0.28 -2.84 0.49
Short aid * openness, Sachs Warner 372 0.98 2.52 0.00 20.02
Short aid * policy index 372 3.31 6.68 -48.34 46.83
Short aid * 1982-89 dummy 372 0.83 2.21 0.00 15.53
Short aid * 1990-2001 dummy 372 1.36 3.11 0.00 20.02
Short aid squared * 1982-89 dummy 372 5.54 23.79 0.00 241.33
Short aid squared * 1990-2001 dummy 372 11.52 41.09 0.00 400.80
Note: See data appendix for details. Excludes lagged variables except for lagged civil war. 
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Appendix Table 3.  Country Sample 
 
 
Latin America & Carribean  Asia  Eastern Europe  Middle East and North Africa  Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Argentina, 1974-2001  China*, 1990-2001  Bulgaria, 1994-2001  Algeria, 1998-2001  Botswana, 1978-2001 
Bolivia, 1974-2001  India, 1974-2001  Cyprus, 1978-2001  Egypt, Arab Rep., 1978-2001  Burkina Faso, 1974-2001 
Brazil, 1974-2001  Indonesia*, 1974-2001  Hungary, 1994-2001  Iran, Islamic Rep., 1978-2001 Cameroon,  1978-2001 
Chile, 1974-2001  South Korea*, 1974-1997  Poland, 1998-2001  Jordan, 1974-2001  Congo, Dem. Rep., 1974-2001 
Colombia, 1974-2001  Malaysia*, 1974-2001  Romania, 1994-2001  Morocco, 1974-2001  Congo, Rep., 1994-2001 
Costa Rica, 1974-2001  Pakistan, 1974-2001  Russian Federation, 1998-2001  Syrian Arab Republic, 1974-2001  Cote d'Ivoire, 1982-2001 
Dominican Republic, 1974-2001  Papua New Guinea, 1978-2001  Turkey, 1974-2001  Tunisia, 1974-2001  Ethiopia, 1982-2001 
Ecuador, 1974-2001  Philippines*, 1974-2001      Gabon, 1974-1993 
El Salvador, 1974-2001  Singapore*, 1974-2001      Gambia, The, 1974-1985 
Guatemala, 1974-2001  Sri Lanka, 1974-2001      Ghana, 1974-1997 
Haiti, 1974-2001  Thailand*, 1974-2001      Kenya, 1974-2001 
Honduras,  1974-2001     Madagascar,  1974-2001 
Jamaica,  1978-2001     Malawi,  1982-1993 
Mexico,  1974-2001     Mali,  1990-2001 
Nicaragua,  1974-2001     Niger,  1978-1981 
Paraguay,  1974-2001     Nigeria,  1974-2001 
Peru,  1974-2001     Senegal,  1974-2001 
Trinidad and Tobago, 1978-1997        Sierra Leone, 1974-2001 
Uruguay,  1974-2001     Togo,  1978-2001 
Venezuela,  RB,  1974-2001     Uganda,  1982-2001 
    Zambia,  1974-1997 
    Zimbabwe,  1982-1997 
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